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THE NCAA’S TRANSFER OF POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
FUTURE IMPLICATIONS THE PROPOSED NCAA TRANSFER
RULES WILL HAVE ON THE LANDSCAPE OF
COLLEGE SPORTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The age of National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”)
basketball free agency is upon us1  Growing up, athletes have the
ability to change Amateur Athletic Union (“AAU”) teams or high
school teams whenever there is a hint of trouble.2  That desire for
instant gratification has made its way into the NCAA and has mani-
fested itself in the NCAA’s proposal to change the current transfer
rules.3  Student-athletes transfer for many reasons: lack of playing
time, poor performance, head coaching changes, reduced scholar-
ships, mom’s home cooking, et cetera.4  However, a student-athlete
cannot simply fill out a few forms and be on his way to a new pro-
gram.5  The NCAA has a long list of complex rules regarding the
1. See Nicole Auerbach & Eric Prisbell, College Basketball’s Free Agency Era, USA
TODAY (Nov. 6, 2012, 8:56 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/
2012/11/06/ncaa-mens-college-basketball-transfers/1679115/ (drawing compari-
sons between high profile basketball players switching AAU and high schools when
they “think they’re [not] getting enough shots – or free shoes” to college student-
athletes desiring to change schools for similar reasons).  Overall, there are mixed
opinions amongst both players and coaches at the college level regarding such
frequent transfers. See id. (quoting Eric Snow, “It was a bad sign [to transfer] when
I was in college”).  Snow played for the Michigan State Spartans from 1991-1995.
See id. (noting different approach to transferring in early to mid-1990s).  Although
some former and current players and coaches agree with Snow, many do not actu-
ally encourage “free agency” in college basketball because “coaches can move
freely from job to job with no penalty, but players cannot.” Id.  (explaining Duke
University Head Coach Mike Krzyzewski advocates free transfers in college
basketball).
2. See id. (explaining stigma once associated with transferring universities has
been eliminated because of mass amounts of transfers that have occurred in ath-
letes’ lives growing up).
3. See id. (quoting University of Texas El Paso’s Head Coach Tim Floyd who
called amount of transfers “epidemic” that reflects players’ desire to “seek[ ] in-
stant gratification”).
4. See Rick Allen, Athletic Scholarships and Transfer Issues, INFORMED ATHLETE,
http://www.informedathlete.com/athletic-scholarships-transfer-issues# (last visited
Dec. 19, 2013) (listing potential reasons student-athletes want to transfer schools
in middle of their college career).
5. See Get the Facts About Transfer, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/re-
sources/media-center/news/get-facts-about-transfers (last visited Feb. 19, 2014)
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procedure and protocol a student-athlete must follow in order to
transfer.6
Recently, the NCAA transfer rules have been under fire and
there has been a movement for change, especially in NCAA basket-
ball.7  Statistics show that about forty-percent of men’s basketball
players will not play for their original school by the end of their
sophomore year.8  This has become a growing concern and the
NCAA has plans to make changes to its transfer rules.9
The most controversial aspect of the current transfer rules has
been the restrictive “permission to contact” rule.10  This rule states
that in order for a student-athlete to transfer schools and maintain
his scholarship, he must receive permission from his original school
to contact the school to which he wishes to transfer.11  If the stu-
dent-athlete does not receive permission to contact another school,
then the student-athlete may transfer, but will lose his scholarship
in the process.12  This rule has been subject to much criticism be-
cause it gives universities unlimited discretion over whether to allow
a student-athlete the ability to transfer to a different university while
maintaining his scholarship.13
6. See generally Transfer 101: Basic Information You Need to Know About Transfer-
ring to an NCAA College, NCAA, May 2012, available at http://www.ncaapublications.
com/productdownloads/TGONLINE2012.pdf [hereinafter Basic Transfer Rules]
(providing “basic” rules for transferring between NCAA schools for Divisions I, II,
and III).
7. See Dana O’Neil, NCAA: It’s Time to Look at Transfers, ESPN.COM (Jul. 13,
2012), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/8157631/ncaa-
turns-attention-transfers-eye-penalties-tampering (explaining flaws with current
NCAA transfer rules).
8. See Transfer Epidemic: 40 Percent of Basketball Players Change Schools, SPORTING
NEWS (Nov. 3, 2012, 1:46 PM), http://aol.sportingnews.com/ncaa-basketball/
story/2012-11-03/transfer-epidemic-40-percent-of-basketball-players-change-
schools [hereinafter Transfer Epidemic] (describing amount of interest men’s col-
lege basketball players have in transferring to well-known schools after successful
season).
9. See id. (predicting potential changes in NCAA’s transfer rules will include
alterations to “permission to contact rules, the one-time transfer exception and
[other] academic concerns”).
10. See Dana O’Neil, supra note 7 (stating difficulty in reconciling require- R
ment that some student-athlete transfers sit out one year and some do not depend-
ing on sport).
11. See Basic Transfer Rules, supra note 6, at 9-10 (providing overview of “per- R
mission to contact” rule for NCAA transfers).
12. See id. (noting when permission to contact another school is required and
what potential results when NCAA protocol is not followed).
13. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Membership Modifies Transfer Waiver Guidelines,
NCAA.ORG (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
ncaa/resources/latest+news/2012/november/membership+modifies+transfer+
waiver+guidelines (stating NCAA’s Division I Legislative Council’s Subcommittee
for Legislative Relief made changes in response to “current waiver trends and a
2
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Early in 2012, NCAA President Mark Emmert announced that
the NCAA recognized these problems and inconsistencies with its
transfer rules.14  The NCAA is not a state actor, and therefore, when
the NCAA and its member institutions make decisions regarding
transfers, student-athletes cannot bring due process or other claims
against the NCAA to counter its rulings.15  This disproportionate
distribution of power, along with high profile media coverage of its
inconsistent application, led President Emmert to establish a task
force to amend and change the transfer rules while maintaining a
focus on academics.16  He admitted that “some of our rules were
made with competitive intent rather than academic concern” and
that the NCAA needed to consider making changes to the transfer
rules while considering all potential implications of potential
changes.17
The NCAA’s Leadership Council (“Council”) began brain-
storming ideas for transfer rule changes in October 2012.18  Among
other changes, the Council planned on rewarding student-athletes
who possess a strong grade-point average by eliminating the
belief among the membership that waiver decisions were not consistent from case
to case”); see also William C. Martin, Comment, The Graduate Transfer Rule: Is the
NCAA Unnecessarily Hindering Student-Athletes from Traversing the Educational Paths
They Desire?, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 103 (2008) (examining NCAA’s applica-
tion and validity of graduate transfer rule utilized throughout 2006-07 collegiate
school year); Heather Dinich, NCAA Transfer Rules Too Inconsistent, ESPN.COM (Jul.
13, 2012, 4:30 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/ncfnation/post/_/id/62891/ncaa-
transfer-rules-too-inconsistent (noting inconsistencies in transfer rules in college
football).
14. See Transfer Rules Won’t Be Easily Lifted, ESPN.COM (May 17, 2012, 8:19
PM), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7942963/ncaa-transfer-re-
strictions-easily-lifted  (stating Emmert has said “something should be done to
make transfer rules less onerous for athletes”).
15. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179
(1988) (holding NCAA is not state actor despite state-school University of Nevada
Las Vegas complying with NCAA’s standards and rules). But see Cohane v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n ex rel. Brand, 215 F.App’x 13, 15-16 (2d Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing it improper for district court to “interpret Tarkanian as holding categorically
that the NCAA can never be a state actor when it conducts an investigation of a
state school”).
16. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (explaining NCAA’s understanding of sig- R
nificance of transferring student-athletes and NCAA’s desire to tailor rules to
“make sure student-athletes are academically successful”).
17. Id. (providing President Emmert’s understanding importance for consid-
ering alterations in transfer rules and that it is “not a quick fix”).
18. See Matt Norlander, Why/When a New Transfer Rule Could Have Big Effects on
College Hoops, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 4, 2013, 2:29 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/col-
legebasketball/blog/eye-on-college-basketball/21494783/whywhen-a-new-transfer-
rule-could-have-big-effects-on-college-hoops (emphasizing possibility of transfer
rule changes and significant impact it will have in all NCAA sports).
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mandatory sit-out year should they decide to transfer.19  After its
initial proposal in April 2013, the Council decided it should focus
its reform on altering the imbalance of power between universities
and their student-athletes through altering the “permission to con-
tact” rule.20  These potential changes will significantly alter the
rules and could have potential consequences on student-athletes,
universities and the fans watching at home.21
Although the Council has only provided principles that will
guide its eventual proposal, the proposed rules will ultimately lead
to the end of amateurism in college sports.22   The new transfer
rules will lead to the creation of free agency in college sports be-
cause student-athletes will be able to transfer from university to uni-
versity without restrictions from their original schools or losing
their scholarships.23  The creation of a free agency system will cre-
ate the desire for student-athletes to protect their rights against the
NCAA and other legislative bodies that may attempt to limit or in-
fringe upon those rights.24  Thus, once there is free agency, stu-
dent-athletes will collectively act as a union to bargain with the
NCAA for better rights, playing conditions, and ultimately mone-
tary compensation.25
19. See id. (noting significance of this potential change on academic year-in-
residence rule).
20. See Report of the National Collegiate Athletic Association Division I Leadership
Council, April 11, 2013, Meeting, NCAA, at 3 (2013), available at http://www.athletic
scholarships.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/LDC+Report+and+Att.+4.11.13.
pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Meeting] (providing detailed notes on
Council’s desire to alter transfer rules including desire to tie academics to waiver
of “the Basic Transfer Rule,” and revision of “the permission to contact” rules).
21. For a more detailed discussion on the consequences of the changes to the
NCAA Transfer Rules, see infra notes 105-232 and accompanying text. R
22. For a detailed discussion of the NCAA’s proposed transfer rules, see infra
notes 90-104 and accompanying text.  For a detailed discussion of the end of ama- R
teurism in college sports as a result of the NCAA’s change in transfer rules, see
infra notes 105-206 and accompanying text. R
23. See Matt Norlander, supra note 18 (providing NCAA’s awareness that alter- R
ations with transfer rules may lead to “full-blown free agency in transfers”).
24. See Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, Article, A Union of Amateurs: A
Legal Blueprint to Reshape Big-Time College Athletics, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 1003, 1004
(2012) (detailing instance in 1994-95 season where NCAA basketball player formu-
lated plan to strike before major post-season game).  The players on both teams
wanted to strike and not compete unless “they received an equitable share of the
revenue their labor generated.” See id. (explaining student-athletes desire to strike
when their rights are infringed upon).
25. See id. at 1070-71 (noting “potential of unionization of college athletes is,
of course, closely tied to” providing monetary compensation).  Although it may be
difficult to speculate how much college athletes would be paid, the agreement
distributing money would be similar to those revenue sharing agreements negoti-
ated by unions in professional football and basketball. See id. (explaining in pro-
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Currently, no practical model exists for the NCAA to provide
monetary compensation to all of its student-athletes.26  Universities
will lose money trying to provide for their student-athletes and, as a
result, funding to academics may suffer.27  Many universities may
need to cut some or all of their athletic programs and sacrifice the
invaluable benefits such athletic programs bring to universities in
order to pay revenue-earning student-athletes.28  Thus, the solution
to this problem is to create independent institutions, related to the
universities, which hire athletes out of high school and run the uni-
versities’ large revenue earning sports, such as basketball and foot-
ball.29  This solution will completely change college sports off the
field; however, to the fans, student-athletes and universities, college
sports will be just as competitive, profitable, and exciting as ever.30
This Comment provides an overview of the current and pro-
posed transfer rules—explaining that the creation and implementa-
tion of these rules will result in free agency, unionization and the
destruction of amateurism in college sports—and proposes the cre-
ation of independent, privatized institutions for revenue sports as
fessional basketball and football, “player’s associations have salary agreements that
fix total athlete compensation as a percentage of league and club revenues”).
26. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint: Paying College
Athletes, THE SPORT JOURNAL, http://www.thesportjournal.org/article/
pointcounterpoint-paying-college-athletes, (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (providing
multiple models for paying college athletes more than just scholarship money).
27. See Liz Clarke, Olympics 2012: As Colleges Struggle to Support Non-Revenue
Sports, the United States’ Olympic Future Is Threatened, WASH. POST, June 2, 2012, avail-
able at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-06-02/sports/35460272_1_col-
lege-sports-olympic-sport-college-campuses (explaining non-revenue sports have
become “an endangered species” at many major universities).  Most of these large
colleges are dropping non-revenue earning varsity sport teams in order to “invest
more heavily in the revenue-generating sports of football and men’s basketball.”
See id. (relating this cut of non-revenue sports to potential long-term effects it may
have on United States’ Olympic competitiveness).
28. See Joe Drape, Cal-Berkeley Cuts 5 Athletic Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28,
2010, at B16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/sports/29cal.
html?_r=0 (stating University of California, Berkeley eliminated five of its intercol-
legiate sports due to necessity of subsidizing those sports with academic money);
see also Tyler Weyant, Around the University System: Towson Will Likely Cut Sports
Teams, THE DIAMONDBACK (Oct. 5, 2012, 10:28 AM), http://www.diamondbackon-
line.com/blogs/article_e3a984a8-0ef8-11e2-826e-001a4bcf6878.html (noting re-
cent trend in most universities of cutting sports programs to “maintain their
financial stability”).
29. See Donald H. Yee, Privatize College Football? Let’s Treat Sport for What It Is –
Professional, THE NEWS TRIB., Aug. 22, 2010, available at http://www.thenewstrib-
une.com/2010/08/22/1309979/privatize-college-football-lets.html (providing
proposal to privatize big, revenue-making sports at universities).
30. For a discussion on the consequences of privatizing big revenue sports,
see infra notes 207-232 and accompanying text. R
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the resolution to those issues.31  Section II dives into the current
transfer rules and explains the current protocol a student-athlete
must follow if he wishes to transfer, including abiding by the per-
mission to contact rule.32  Further, Section II analyzes the inequities
of the current transfer rules due to universities’ unrestricted power
determine whether a student-athlete can transfer to a different uni-
versity.33  Section III presents the proposed set of rules which the
NCAA expects will remedy the imbalance of power between the
NCAA and its member institutions, and student-athletes.34  Section
IV analyzes the impact that the new rules will have on college bas-
ketball and other sports and explains how these rules will lead to
free agency, players’ unions, and ultimately the destruction of ama-
teurism in college sports.35  These changes to college sports will
force universities to either get rid of large revenue-generating
sports teams in order to maintain a well-balanced institution with
academic programs and smaller non-revenue sports teams, or main-
tain large revenue-generating sports programs while discarding the
smaller non-revenue sports teams and potentially sacrificing the
quality of the institution’s academics.36  Section IV concludes with a
proposition that will remedy those consequences by having univer-
sities establish independent, yet related, institutions for sports.37
31. For an explanation of the proposed solution to the potential destruction
of amateurism in NCAA revenue sports, see infra notes 207 to 232 and accompany- R
ing text.
32. For a more detailed discussion on the current NCAA transfer rules, see
infra notes 43-67 and accompanying text. R
33. For a discussion on the inequities in the NCAA and examples of NCAA
coaches unnecessarily preventing their players from transferring, see infra notes
68-89 and accompanying text. R
34. For a more detailed discussion on the proposed NCAA transfer rules, see
infra notes 90-104 and accompanying text. R
35. For a more detailed discussion on the impact and consequences the pro-
posed transfer rules will have on college sports, see infra notes 105-206 and accom- R
panying text.
36. See Clarke, supra note 27 (detailing that shifting priorities in college ath- R
letic departments are leading to decline of smaller non-revenue-earning sports de-
spite benefits those sports programs provide in developing athletes into productive
members of society).
37. For a more detailed discussion on the creation of independent athletic
institutions as a resolution to the issue of rationalizing paid student-athletes and
unpaid student-athletes at the same university, see infra notes 207-232 and accom- R
panying text.
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II. CURRENT COLLEGE SPORTS TRANSFER RULES
A. The NCAA
The NCAA was originally formed to protect student-athletes
from potential physical dangers in college sports.38  As time went
on, the NCAA’s protection expanded to include more than just the
physical risks in collegiate athletics.39  Today, the NCAA continues
to protect amateur college student-athletes with an increased em-
phasis on both athletics and academic excellence.40  Of the more
than one thousand colleges and universities that compete within
the NCAA, each must comply with the rules and guidelines that the
NCAA posits in order to remain a member school and compete.41
Thus, compliance with the NCAA’s rules is a key aspect in maintain-
ing order and structure within collegiate sports.42
B. Current Transfer Rules
In maintaining uniformity with its rules, the NCAA has specific
regulations for those student-athletes who wish to transfer schools
during their collegiate career.43  The NCAA transfer rules begin by
38. See History, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
ncaa/about+the+ncaa/history (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (stating President
Roosevelt encouraged reform of college athletics, resulting in creation of Intercol-
legiate Athletic Association of the United States (“IAAUS”), which sought to pro-
tect students from dangers of college sports); see also J. Trevor Johnston, Show Them
the Money: The Threat of NCAA Athlete Unionization in Response to the Commercialization
of College Sports, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 203, 205-06 (2003) (providing overview
and purpose of NCAA).
39. See History, supra note 38 (providing history of NCAA and role it played in R
forming divisions, administering women’s programs and protecting amateurism in
college sports).
40. See id. (explaining emphasis NCAA places on academic success despite its
intended purpose of protecting young people from “the dangerous and exploitive
athletics practices of the time”); see also Sarah M. Konsky, An Antitrust Challenge to
the NCAA Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2003) (questioning sincer-
ity of NCAA’s claims that it exists to promote academics in collegiate athletics).
41. See Who We Are, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/
public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are+landing+page (last visited Dec. 19,
2013) (providing number of colleges and universities currently competing in
NCAA).
42. See Rules Compliance: Enforcement, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/
wcm/connect/public/ncaa/enforcement/index.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2013)
(providing that NCAA enforcement staff “holds member institutions accountable
by seeking out and processing information about possible violations of NCAA
rules, giving schools an opportunity to respond and presenting facts to member-
ship-led committees”).
43. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (explaining that “[b]ecause transferring can R
impact a student-athlete’s academic performance, NCAA member institutions have
established rules that require a student-athlete to seriously consider the decision to
transfer before leaving for another campus”).
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identifying whether a student-athlete is eligible for competing in
the NCAA.44  In order for a student-athlete to compete in the
NCAA, his amateurism eligibility will be determined through a cer-
tification process.45  Once a student-athlete is determined to be eli-
gible to compete in the NCAA, he must then be granted
“permission-to-contact” other schools by  his current school’s coach
and athletic director in order to notify potential new schools of his
desire to transfer.46  The NCAA does not allow outside schools’
coaches to contact potential transferees because it contradicts the
NCAA’s mission of “governing competition in a fair . . . and sports-
manlike manner and [integrating] intercollegiate athletics into
higher education.”47
These regulations create two possible scenarios: 1) a student-
athlete’s coach and athletic director give him or her permission to
contact another school or 2) a student-athlete’s coach and athletic
director do not give him or her permission to contact another
school.48  In the first scenario, once a student-athlete is given per-
mission-to-contact another NCAA university, he becomes subject to
the “Basic Transfer Rule” and must spend one academic year at the
new school before being eligible to compete.49  The length of one
44. See Basic Transfer Rules, supra note 6, at 8 (expressing importance of know- R
ing one’s eligibility status prior to taking further steps to transfer schools).
45. See id. at 9 (listing potential pre-collegiate enrollment activities that could
render student-athlete ineligible).  Among those activities are contracts with a pro-
fessional team, salary for participating in athletics, prize money, play with profes-
sionals, tryouts with a professional team, benefits from an agent or prospective
agent, agreement to be represented by an agent and delaying full-time collegiate
enrollment to participate in organized sports competition. See id. (noting various
actions student-athletes may take which render them ineligible for NCAA
competition).
46. See id. (stating student-athlete may write to any NCAA school expressing
interest in transferring, but that new school’s coach may not discuss transfer op-
portunities).  If the student-athlete’s current school will not grant permission-to-
contact the new school, another school cannot contact the student-athlete and, if
the student-athlete does decide to transfer to another NCAA Division I or II
school, the student-athlete cannot receive an athletics scholarship until he has
been at the school for one academic year. See id. (explaining burden placed on
student-athletes when deciding to transfer).  Further, if the student-athlete’s cur-
rent school denies permission-to-contact, then the student-athlete may appeal the
decision to a panel of individuals from the current school who are not involved in
athletics. See id. (providing details of intricacies of transfer rules).
47. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (explaining equal protection in preventing R
outside coaches from recruiting potential transfers from opposing schools).
48. See Basic Transfer Rules, supra note 6, at 9 (providing explanation of rules R
governing written permission to contact).  For a detailed discussion on the ineq-
uity this rule may have on a student-athlete wishing to transfer, see infra notes 68- R
80 and accompanying text. R
49. See Basic Transfer Rules, supra note 6, at 10 (providing Basic Transfer Rule R
protocol as being that when student-athletes transfer from  two-year school and
8
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academic year is determined by the new university and is either two
full-time semesters or three full-time quarters.50  The academic
year-in-residence is a requirement because it gives the student-ath-
lete time to adjust to his new school and ensure that academics was
a key motivation for his transfer.51  Despite having to sit out for one
academic year, a student-athlete who transfers after being granted
permission to contact another school can receive an athletic schol-
arship during the year that he sits out of competition.52
In the second scenario, despite the lack of permission to con-
tact another university, the student-athlete still has the ability to
transfer to another university; however, eligibility is limited.53  First,
no other universities may contact the student-athlete and en-
courage him to transfer.54  Second, once the student-athlete con-
tacts the other school and has transferred, he will be unable to
receive an athletic scholarship until he has been at the university
for one full year.55  This deters transferees from contacting other
schools without permission because it requires transferees to pay
for school themselves.56  Additionally, as in the first scenario, the
Basic Transfer Rule requires transfer student-athletes to sit out of
does not meet the transfer requirements, or if student-athletes transfer from four-
year school, then he must spend one academic year-in-residence at the new school
before he becomes eligible to compete).  The one academic year-in-residence is
often referred to as “sitting out.” See id. (providing terminology relating to aca-
demic year-in-residence).
50. See id. (explaining length of time student-athletes must be enrolled at
their new university before becoming eligible to compete).
51. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (responding to frequently asked question of R
why “football and basketball players have to sit out a year after they transfer?”).
52. See id. (providing general overview of permission to contact rules which
allow student-athletes who have received permission to contact to transfer while
receiving athletic scholarship in first year he is at new university).
53. See Basic Transfer Rules, supra note 6, at 9 (providing explanation of what R
student-athlete must do when not granted permission to contact another university
prior to transferring).
54. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (explaining if student-athlete is not granted R
permission to contact another university, other universities may not contact them
regarding transferring).  Moreover, each athletic conference has its own set of
rules regarding permission to contact and special conditions for releasing a stu-
dent-athlete from their first school. See id. (noting conferences may have more
lenient or more stringent rules regarding release from first school).
55. See Basic Transfer Rules, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining that not receiving R
permission to contact “does not preclude you from transferring; however, if the
new school is in Division I or II, you cannot receive an athletics scholarship until
you have attended the new school for one academic year”).
56. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (explaining coaches have ability to withhold R
permission to contact requiring  transferring student-athlete to pay for his educa-
tion at his new university).
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competition for one full year, only this time without the support of
a scholarship.57
For most sports, a student-athlete is granted a one-time transfer
exception, which allows him to compete immediately after he first
transfers if he meets all other transfer requirements.58  However,
student-athletes that participate in sports in which student-athletes
historically underachieve academically are not eligible for such ex-
ception.59  Further, the NCAA requires student-athletes enrolled in
classes to meet specific criteria showing they are progressing to-
wards a degree.60  Thus, even if a student-athlete is determined to
be eligible, he may only have his eligibility for a certain period of
time.61
Up until this point, all of the NCAA transfer rules are applica-
ble to all student-athletes that are considering transferring, regard-
less of school or Division.62  However, there are specific rules
applicable to each student-athlete depending on the type of school
from which he is transferring (two-year or four-year; Division I, II,
or III) and the type of school to which he will be transferring (two-
year or four-year; Division I, II, or III).63  Focusing on those athletes
transferring between two Division I four-year schools, there are few
exceptions to the Basic Transfer Rule that apply to all collegiate
sports.64  For example, because these exceptions do not apply to
57. See Basic Transfer Rules, supra note 6, at 10 (providing detailed explanation R
of Basic Transfer Rule in college sports requiring one academic year-in-residence).
58. See id. (explaining one of many exceptions to the academic year-in-resi-
dence rule allowed for most student-athletes).
59. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (listing sports with student-athletes who his- R
torically underperform academically as: “basketball, football, baseball and men’s
ice hockey”).
60. See Basic Transfer Rules, supra note 6, at 8 (noting NCAA determines defini- R
tion of “progress toward degree”).
61. See id. at 12 (explaining each Division I student-athlete has five years to
complete four seasons beginning when he enrolls full-time at two or four-year
school; Division II and III student-athletes have ten semesters or 15 quarters in
which to complete all seasons of competition).
62. For a discussion on the basic NCAA transfer rules, see supra notes 43-61 R
and accompanying text.
63. See generally Basic Transfer Rules, supra note 6, at 14-27 (providing rules for R
scenarios such as student-athletes transferring from two-year school to four-year
school; from four-year school to another four-year school; and four-year school to
two-year school and then to four-year school).  For the purposes of this article, only
the scenario in which a student-athlete currently enrolled in a four-year school and
is transferring into another four-year school will be analyzed. See id.
64. See id. at 20-21 (stating exceptions to Basic Transfer Rule for Division I
student-athletes, including exceptions if it is student-athlete’s first transfer, if stu-
dent-athlete returns to his first school without participating at second school, if
student-athlete’s sport is discontinued, if student-athlete has never been recruited,
and if student-athlete did not practice or play in his sport for two years).
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college basketball, whenever a student-athlete that plays basketball
wants to transfer schools, he is not subject to the same exceptions as
similar student-athletes in other sports.65  The NCAA claimed that
this was due to basketball transferees’ historical academic under-
achievement.66  However, in keeping with the times, the NCAA has
decided to make changes to this rule and has taken steps towards
easing the transfer regulations to allow for free flow of transfers
between schools in college sports such as basketball.67
C. Desire to Change the Rules
The current rules have led to many high-profile universities be-
coming subject to negative media attention because they used the
rules coercively to either prevent a student-athlete from transfer-
ring or limited the schools to which they may transfer.68  Jarrod
Uthoff, a former redshirt freshman at the University of Wisconsin,
informed the coaching staff of his intent to transfer somewhere
closer to his home in Iowa.69  However, Wisconsin’s head basketball
coach Bo Ryan severely limited the amount of schools Uthoff could
65. See id. at 20 (noting first transfer exception to Basic Transfer Rule may
only be used if student-athletes are playing  sports other than Division I sports).
66. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (providing NCAA’s reasoning behind not R
allowing exceptions to Basic Transfer Rule for basketball players).
67. See Hosick, supra note 13 (presenting NCAA’s altered guidelines when de- R
termining which student-athletes will receive waivers of Basic Transfer Rule).  The
NCAA decided that relief from the Basic Transfer Rule will be provided when:
The school presents medical documentation of a debilitating injury or
illness to a student-athlete’s immediate family member that is debilitating
and requires ongoing medical care. . . . The student-athlete demonstrates
he or she will be responsible for regular, ongoing caregiving (sic) respon-
sibilities. . . . The school is within a 100-mile radius of the immediate
family member’s home, which demonstrates the ability for the student-
athlete to provide regular, ongoing care. . . . The school to which the
student-athlete is transferring must submit a statement from the athletics
director and faculty athletics representative confirming that the student-
athlete will be relieved of responsibilities to the team in order to care for
the injured or ill family member, and that the coaching staff will support
such a departure.
Id.
68. See Jeff Eisenberg, Wisconsin Severely Restricts Forward Jarrod Uthoff’s Transfer
Options, YAHOO.COM (Apr. 17, 2012, 2:02 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/
ncaab-the-dagger/wisconsin-severely-restricts-forward-jarrod-uthoff-transfer-op-
tions-180208129.html (presenting Wisconsin’s unfair restrictions placed on red-
shirt freshman Jarrod Uthoff upon discovering his intent to transfer).
69. See id. (stating one of key reasons why Uthoff wanted to transfer was to be
closer to home); see also Jarrod Uthoff to Transfer to Iowa, ESPN.COM (Jun. 7, 2012,
5:44 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8018874/jarrod-uthoff-trans-
ferring-wisconsin-badgers-iowa-hawkeyes (noting Uthoff wanted to transfer to Iowa
because he believed “[Wisconsin] Badgers methodical style didn’t fit his skill set,
and he said he feels the [Iowa] Hawkeyes up-tempo pace will”).
11
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contact by not granting permission to contact specific schools.70
Disappointingly, the only contender that Uthoff was granted per-
mission to contact was Creighton University, a smaller, lesser-known
university located in Nebraska.71
According to the NCAA transfer rules, Uthoff could either
transfer to Creighton, sit out a year, and still receive an athletic
scholarship; or he could transfer to another school, sit out for a
year, and lose his scholarship only to re-gain a scholarship and his
competitive eligibility the following year.72  In both scenarios, how-
ever, he would have to sit out for the entire 2012-2013 season.73
Ultimately, Uthoff ended up choosing the latter option, and trans-
ferred closer to home to the University of Iowa.74  Under the NCAA
transfer rules, Uthoff was left to pay for his own tuition and living
expenses for the year.75
In response to the many cases similar to Uthoff’s, President
Emmert created a task force, led by university presidents and NCAA
members from across the country, to determine whether the Basic
Transfer Rule is “meaningful, enforceable and advances student-
athlete well-being.”76  The NCAA is re-assessing the current transfer
rules in light of other high-profile cases such as St. Joseph’s Univer-
sity decision to block Todd O’Brien from transferring to the Uni-
versity of Alabama at Birmingham, and Florida International
University’s denying Dominique Ferguson from a scholarship re-
lease, rejecting his transfer, and forcing him to declare for the NBA
draft instead of returning to college.77  Either option the school
70. See Eisenberg, supra note 68 (explaining Bo Ryan prohibited Uthoff from R
transferring to “the entire Big Ten [Conference], the entire ACC, Iowa State and
Marquette”).
71. See id. (stating Uthoff’s surprise and disappointment after learning that
only opportunity Wisconsin offered was transferring to Creighton).
72. For a discussion of the current transfer rules for collegiate student-ath-
letes, see supra notes 38-67 and accompanying text. R
73. For a discussion of the Basic Transfer Rule in transferring schools, see
supra notes 49-67 and accompanying text. R
74. See Jarrod Uthoff to Transfer to Iowa, supra note 69 (providing Uthoff’s ulti- R
mate decision to transfer to Iowa, in his home state).  Fortunately for Uthoff, he
was in a position where he could afford to pay for his tuition and living expenses
for a year. See id. (“‘We can afford to pay for my education for a year,’ said Uthoff,
19.”).
75. See id. (stating Uthoff will sit out one year and pay for that year on his
own).
76. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (providing answer to frequently asked ques- R
tion, “Is the NCAA going to change the transfer rules?”).
77. See Transfer Rules Won’t Be Easily Lifted, supra note 14 (explaining that “crit- R
ics [are] saying too much power is in the hands of athletic directors and coaches”
and therefore NCAA needs to examine its transfer rules).
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takes is unfair to the student-athlete.78  On the one hand, if a
school grants permission-to-contact and the student-athlete ulti-
mately transfers, the student-athlete must sit out for a year in accor-
dance with the Basic Transfer Rule.79  On the other hand, if a
school does not grant permission-to-contact, the student-athlete can
still transfer to another school; however, that student cannot re-
ceive an athletic scholarship and must still sit out for one year.80
The NCAA and President Emmert may not see the reasons why
schools are preventing student transfers.81  President Emmert has
expressed his concerns with the current rules and has questioned
their efficiency asking, “What’s the rationale for constraining some-
one to move from school to school?”82  From the universities’ per-
spective, coaches are prevented from allowing their players to
change schools because of the academic progress rate (“APR”).83
The APR holds universities accountable for maintaining their
athletes’ eligibility and academic excellence.84  Each student-athlete
that receives athletic-based financial aid earns one retention point
for staying in school, i.e. not transferring, and one eligibility point
for being academically eligible.85  Typically, a university is docked
retention points if their student-athletes transfer and are not aca-
demically eligible; however, if the student-athlete has a cumulative
grade-point average of 2.6 or greater at the time of the transfer,
then the school is not docked a retention point when that student-
78. See id. (presenting alternatives for student-athletes: either be granted per-
mission to transfer and sit out for one year, or being denied permission to transfer,
transferring anyway, and not receiving athletic scholarships).
79. See id. (noting for many players, sitting out for one year is very burden-
some and onerous).
80. See id. (explaining impracticality of transferring to another school but not
receiving any athletics scholarship to majority of student-athletes).
81. See id. (quoting Emmert stating, “What’s the rationale for constraining
someone to move from school to school?”).
82. Id. (quoting President Emmert’s “biggest concern” about “whether it’s
fair or not to the young men and young women” to sit out one year or not receive
scholarships).
83. See Transfer Rules Won’t be Easily Lifted, supra note 14 (“[T]ransfer requests R
are scrutinized more by coaches now because of the possible effect they can have
on a program’s Academic Progress Rate.”).
84. See Academic Progress Rate (APR), NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/
connect/public/NCAA/Academics/Division+I/Academic+Progress+Rate (last vis-
ited Dec. 19, 2013) (stating this metric accounts for “the eligibility and retention of
each student-athlete, each term”).
85. See id. (stating that “[a] team’s total points are divided by points possible
and then multiplied by one thousand to equal the team’s Academic Progress Rate
score”).
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athlete transfers.86  Further, the NCAA uses the APR to determine a
program’s postseason eligibility.87  Thus, many schools are hesitant
to allow their players to transfer to a competing school because the
team will lose retention points and impact the team’s chances to
participate in postseason play.88
To summarize, the flaws that critics have pointed out regarding
the current transfer rules are: 1) the Basic Transfer Rule requiring
a mandatory academic year-in-residence if the former school grants
the transfer, 2) the loss of athletic scholarship after a transfer if the
former school does not grant a transfer, and 3) the APR’s impact
which often steers coaches away from letting their student-athletes
transfer.89
III. THE NCAA’S MODEST PROPOSAL
In light of the critiques of the current transfer system, coupled
with controversial transfer cases that yielded unfair results towards
student-athletes, in October 2012, NCAA President Mark Emmert
created a Leadership Council (“Council”) to analyze and assess the
current transfer rules and provide proposed rules to resolve current
issues with the transfer rules.90  Although the Council has yet to
formally propose any changes to the rules, the Council established
a set of principles for updated transfer rules to guide their decision-
making.91  Those principles state:
86. See Gerald S. Gurney and Richard M. Southall, College Sports’ Bait And
Switch, ESPN.COM (Aug. 9, 2012), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/
8248046/college-sports-programs-find-multitude-ways-game-ncaa-apr (defining
APR exemption).  Transfers who leave a university in good academic standing, i.e.,
with a grade-point average over 2.600, result in no loss of an APR retention point
to the school the transfer is leaving. See id. (explaining universities’ attempts to
inflate student-athletes’ GPA through enrolling those student-athletes in summer
classes in order to prevent loss of APR points if student-athlete decides to transfer).
87. See Academic Progress Rate (APR), supra note 84 (stating team must achieve R
minimum APR benchmark requirement or face postseason bans).
88. See Transfer Rules Won’t be Easily Lifted, supra note 14 (stating that schools R
lose single retention points “if the departing player does not have a grade-point
average of at least 2.6”).
89. For a detailed summary of the current NCAA transfer rules and their in-
equities, see supra notes 38-88 and accompanying text. R
90. See Transfer Facts, supra note 6 (explaining President Emmert’s efforts to R
review existing rules by establishing task force designed to “specifically work on
transfer rules”); see also John Infante, New Transfer Model Would Reduce Eligibility
Consequences, ATHNET (Jan. 3, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/201303250804
53/http://www.athleticscholarships.net/2013/01/03/new-transfer-model-would-
reduce-eligibility-consequences.htm (detailing source of creation of Council in Oc-
tober 2012 as “highly publicized transfer battles”).
91. See John Infante, supra note 90 (noting despite no formal proposal, princi- R
ples exist which Council is following in updating transfer rules).
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(1) Athletes would still need to get permission to contact
another school before transferring. But permission would
be tied to practice and competition, not athletics aid. So
even if permission was denied, the student-athlete would
still be able to receive a scholarship.
(2) Athletes who qualify for the transfer exemption in the
APR would be permitted to play immediately at the new
school. That would make a 2.600 GPA the magic number
to play immediately.
(3) Athletes who do not qualify to play immediately at the
next school would still receive an extension of their five-
year clock so they can use all their eligibility.
(4) Tampering with an athlete by another school would be
considered a severe breach of conduct, a Level I violation,
the highest in the NCAA’s new enforcement structure.92
This model for the transfer rules was slated to be officially proposed
to the NCAA in August 2013 and was likely to become effective for
student-athletes starting in August 2014.93  These proposed princi-
ples address the major criticisms leveled against the current rules.94
With the exception of the fourth principle relating to NCAA viola-
tions and sanctions, when analyzing these principles, the theme of
easing transfer restrictions while emphasizing academics can be
seen.95
Unfortunately, at the April 11, 2013 Council meeting, a uni-
form overhaul of the transfer rules was rejected; however, the
Council agreed the transfer rules needed to be changed and stated
its goals to alter the over-restrictive “permission to contact” rules,
and tie academics to the waiver of transfer rules.96  Prior to these
considerations, a student-athlete’s current school severely limited
that student-athlete’s ability to transfer.97  Wisconsin University se-
verely limited Jarrod Uthoff’s ability to transfer when it denied him
permission to contact the University of Iowa, thus forcing Uthoff to
92. Id. (providing list of principles Council presented and model their propo-
sal will be framed after).
93. See id. (producing timeline for NCAA’s proposed transfer rules to take
effect).
94. For a detailed discussion of the major critiques of the NCAA’s current
transfer rules, see supra notes 38-89 and accompanying text. R
95. For a detailed discussion on desires to change the current transfer rules,
see supra notes 68-89 and accompanying text. R
96. See Meeting, supra note 20, at 3 (providing Council’s initiatives for altering R
and ultimately changing NCAA transfer rules).
97. For a detailed discussion on the current transfer rules for Division I stu-
dent-athletes, see supra notes 38-67 and accompanying text. R
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lose his scholarship when he transferred.98  However, the most re-
cent proposal for change suggests that permission to contact an-
other school will not be related to athletic financial aid, which may
prevent universities from forcing  student-athletes, like Jarrod
Uthoff, to pay for his enrollment at another school.99
Further, the new proposal seeks to reevaluate the ties between
academics and transferring and consider future changes that will
waive the Basic Transfer Rule in a wider and more consistent range
of situations.100  By tying academics into the transfer rules, the
NCAA will implement an academic standard that it wishes its stu-
dent-athletes to abide by without blatantly creating strict academic
requirements.101  Further, considering waiving the academic year-
in-residence requirement may allow those student-athletes with suf-
ficient grades to transfer to a new school and begin playing immedi-
ately.102  Finally, removing the strict permission to contact rule
would provide student-athletes with more freedom to select which
school they wish to transfer to and serve as the beginning of balanc-
ing power between student-athletes and universities.103  Although
these principles are merely proposals to alter the current transfer
rules, the potential effects they can have on the current landscape
of college sports will be widespread.104
98. For a discussion on Wisconsin’s unfair treatment of Jarrod Uthoff, see
supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text. R
99. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (explaining that transfer rules mandate that R
“in order to receive an athletics scholarship at another school, a student-athlete
must receive permission to contact another school . . . from the initial school”).
The new principles seek to eliminate the possibility of a school denying permission
to contact another school by coercing the student-athlete not to transfer because
of a lack of scholarship, thus making it easier for a student-athlete to transfer and
while still maintaining her scholarship. See Jon Infante, supra note 90 (stating pop- R
ular opinion for new rules was modeled off of desire to prevent coaches from
blocking where student-athletes could transfer).
100. See Meeting, supra note 20, at 3 (noting each initiative NCAA’s Leadership R
Council is considering for altering its transfer rules).
101. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (stating NCAA’s research has shown that R
“student-athletes who transfer with at least a 2.6 grade-point average have the same
likelihood of academic success as a student-athlete who remains at his or her origi-
nal institution”).
102. See Joe Christensen, NCAA Ponders New Standards, STARTRIBUNE (Jan. 16,
2013, 12:13 PM), http://www.startribune.com/sports/gophers/187049331.html?
refer=y (analyzing proposed rule that student-athletes would not have to sit out
one year with grade-point average of 2.6 and greater in light of NCAA’s research).
103. See Meeting, supra note 20, at 3 (presenting NCAA’s acknowledgement of R
necessary alterations to its transfer rules, with emphasis on changing permission to
contact rules).
104. For a detailed discussion on the proposed principles for alterations in
the NCAA transfer rules, see supra notes 90-103 and accompanying text. R
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IV. ANALYZING FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED
TRANSFER RULES
A. Resulting Consequences
The NCAA is making an effort to ease the restrictions on col-
lege basketball student-athletes that wish to transfer; however, these
changes will bring many consequences.105  Despite the NCAA’s
good intentions, potentially allowing student-athletes to freely
transfer between schools without being restricted by the “permis-
sion to contract” and with potential waivers of the academic-year-in-
residence period will lead to student-athletes transferring at a much
higher rate.106  This may ultimately lead to the creation of a system
similar to the free agency system in professional sports.107  A free
agency system in college basketball will likely lead to players, in
105. For a detailed discussion on the proposed NCAA transfer rules, see supra
notes 90-104 and accompanying text.  For a detailed discussion on the potential R
consequences of the proposed NCAA transfer rules, see infra notes 113-206 and R
accompanying text.
106. See Patrick Rishe, Growing Transfer Rates Exacerbate Hypocrisy of Student-Ath-
lete Moniker In Basketball, FORBES.COM (Nov. 7, 2012, 11:53AM), http://www.forbes.
com/sites/prishe/2012/11/07/growing-transfer-rates-exacerbate-hypocrisy-of-stu-
dent-athlete-moniker-in-revenue-sports/ (noting trends in transfer rate in men’s
college basketball).  The key statistics about men’s basketball transfer rates are that
ten percent of the 4,433 scholarships available from NCAA Division I men’s basket-
ball teams are switching universities through transfer; men’s college basketball has
more than double the transfers of college football and more than triple that of
college baseball; and the transfer rate in men’s basketball is thirty-six-percent
greater than the rate of the overall student-athlete population. See id. (providing
statistics regarding men’s college basketball transfers); see also Luke Winn, Examin-
ing The Biggest Trend To Hit College Basketball Transfers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 18,
2012, 11:29AM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/luke_winn/07/
18/up-transfers-NCAA-basketball/index.html (explaining increase in up-transfer-
ring in college basketball).  Up-transferring is the transfer of one college basket-
ball student-athlete to another school that meets one of the following three
criteria:
1. Moved from a mid-major school or conference to a major school or
conference;
2. Moved from a less-decorated major school or conference to a recent
national champion school (such as University of Kentucky, University of
Connecticut, Duke University, University of North Carolina, Kansas Uni-
versity, University of Florida, and Syracuse University);
3. Moved from a lesser-known school to an elite mid-major school (such
as Xavier University, Gonzaga University and Butler University).
See id. (providing details of recent increase in “up-transferring” over years due to
athlete’s desire to play more and coaches desire to recruit student-athletes after
they have been in college).
107. See Matt Norlander, supra note 18 (explaining NCAA’s awareness of po- R
tential creation of free agency in college basketball).  The NCAA is trying to find a
compromise between having a full-blown free agency system for transfers and pro-
viding student-athletes some equity in transferring while maintaining an emphasis
on the student’s academic progress. See id. (explaining NCAA’s plan to reward
transfers who excel in classroom); see also Sarah M. Konsky, supra note 40, at 1586- R
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both college basketball and all other college sports, banding to-
gether in an effort to protect their rights and form a college ath-
letes’ union.108  Moreover, once a players’ union or similar entity is
formed, student-athletes will use their collective power to make uni-
versities and the NCAA compensate them monetarily for their
play.109  As a result of players unionizing and being compensated
for their play, major college sports, including basketball and foot-
ball, may become too big for the colleges and universities they re-
present due to increased salaries, inequity between revenue earning
and non-revenue earning sports, and ultimately the difficulty in bal-
ancing amateur and non-amateur sports.110  The solution to the
problem of reconciling paying some student-athletes and not
others will be the creation of a separate, but related, corporate insti-
tution where high school players that wish to play professionally will
attend in order to hone their athletic skills and focus on sports.111
87 (stating, “Free movement within the market would ultimately reflect an optimal
matching of players and teams.”).
108. See Jon Solomon, College Athletes’ Rights: Why Don’t Athletes Strike Back at
NCAA System? AL.COM (Apr. 3, 2011, 9:08 AM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.
ssf/2011/04/college_athletes_rights_why_do.html (arguing that college athletes
should organize and eventually “boycott” NCAA in order to get more rights in
creating rules for college athletes); see also Mission & Goals, NCPA, http://www.
ncpanow.org/more?id=0004 (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (presenting National Col-
lege Players Association’s (NCPA) mission and goals).  One of the stated missions
of the NCPA is to “[g]uarantee that college athletes are granted an athletic release
from their university if they wish to transfer schools.” See id. (providing players’
perspective on inequity in NCAA’s current transfer rules); see also Sarah M. Konsky,
supra note 40, at 1595 (describing current NCAA transfer rules as violating Sher- R
man Antitrust Act because of restriction of market).
109. See Rachel Cohen & Ralph D. Russo, Paying College Athletes: Not If, But
How, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 6, 2013, 4:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/01/07/paying-college-athletes_n_2424429.html (stating student-athletes,
coaches, and NCAA President Mark Emmert all believe college athletes should be
compensated monetarily for playing for their schools); see also Joe Nocera, Let’s
Start Paying College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2011, at MM30, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/magazine/lets-start-paying-college-athletes.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (advocating pay for college athletes and providing a five
point plan to implementing pay in college sports); Michael Wilbon, College Athletes
Deserve to be Paid, ESPN.COM (July 18, 2011), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/
story/_/id/6778847/college-athletes-deserve-paid (explaining inequity college
athletes experience based on millions of dollars in revenue they provide for their
universities through television contracts, but not receiving any portion of it).
110. For a detailed discussion on the rise of free agency in college sports and
the potential destruction of amateurism resulting from the change in transfer
rules, see infra notes 113-232 and accompanying text. R
111. See Bill Maloney, Separate College Sports From Academics, KENTUCKY.COM,
June 27, 2010, http://www.kentucky.com/2010/06/27/1325645/separate-college-
sports-from-academics.html (proposing divorcing college sports from academic
side of university to, inter alia, save university money and stop one-and-done basket-
ball players from being “a mockery of a student-athlete”); see also Laura Pappano,
How Big-Time Sports Ate College Life, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, at ED22, available at
18
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Although these consequences may seem extreme, by loosening the
restrictions on transfers for NCAA basketball, the NCAA is taking
the first step to dividing academics and athletics across all sports in
all universities.112
1. The Creation of Collegiate Free Agency
The proposed NCAA transfer regulations will allow students to
transfer more easily to a different university and, in certain in-
stances, play immediately, thereby creating free agency in college
basketball.113  Student-athletes with higher grades will have the abil-
ity choose which university he wishes to play for even after he has
been recruited from high school or prep school.114  This free trans-
fer of student-athletes creates a system similar to free agency seen in
professional leagues.115  Free agency is a state where a player is no
longer under a contract with his original team and he may sign a
contract with another team for the following season.116  Currently,
this is not possible due to the one academic year-in-residence re-
quirement; however, under the proposed initiatives, if a player has
a requisite GPA, then he may transfer to a different school, sign off
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/education/edlife/how-big-time-sports-ate-
college-life.html?pagewanted=all (explaining that college sports dominate all as-
pects of collegiate life for students at schools with big athletic programs).  William
E. Kirwan, chancellor of the University of Maryland system and co-director of the
Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics has said, “We’ve reached a point
where big-time intercollegiate athletics is undermining the integrity of our institu-
tions, diverting presidents and institutions from their main purpose.” See id. (not-
ing shift in focus from academics to athletics in universities with big sports
programs).
112. For a detailed discussion on the consequences of loosening the transfer
regulations on college basketball players, see infra notes 113-206 and accompany- R
ing text.
113. For a detailed discussion on the proposed new transfer rules and regula-
tions, see supra notes 90-104 and accompanying text. R
114. See Matt Norlander supra note 18 (explaining many coaches under new R
regulations will ask, “Who’s a good player with good grades whom we might be
able to lure?”).
115. See id. (arguing that only key aspect preventing full-blown free agency is
GPA qualification).  Those student-athletes with good GPAs can transfer immedi-
ately but those with lower GPAs will not want to sit out a year and therefore will not
want to transfer. See id. (stating reasoning NCAA is implementing this rule – im-
prove grades of transfers and prevent those with lower GPAs from transferring).
116. See A Glossary of NBA Terms, NBA.COM (Oct. 22, 2001, 6:56 PM), http://
www.nba.com/analysis/00422966.html (providing a definition of free agency,
among other various terms used in NBA); see also William C. Martin, supra note 13, R
at 125 (providing descriptions and explaining differences of restricted and un-
restricted free agents in professional free agency).
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on a new scholarship, and play immediately, just like a free
agent.117
Unlike free agency, a student-athlete’s grades may restrict him
or her.118  The 2.6 benchmark the NCAA considered will likely be
used in future transfer rule reform because the NCAA has found
that student-athletes with this average have the same likelihood of
academic success as student-athletes who remain at their original
school.119  In most universities a 2.6 GPA is roughly equivalent to a
letter grade of a low “B” or a “B-.”120  While this may not be as easily
attainable for some student-athletes, for those that reach this
benchmark, free agency awaits.121
The new proposed transfer rules, have both potential benefits
and potential detriments that could change the landscape of col-
lege basketball and, potentially all college sports.122  First, student-
athletes will be more likely to keep their grades at or above the 2.6
benchmark in case they suddenly desire to transfer.123  This is the
NCAA’s primary goal with implementing the rule, and this result is
likely to occur in the immediate years following its
implementation.124
Moreover, allowing free transfers will lead to an increase in
parity in college basketball.125  With the rise of the mid-major con-
ference universities (“mid-majors”), college basketball has become
117. For a discussion on the NCAA’s proposed rule changes, see supra notes
90-104 and accompanying text. R
118. See Ty Duffy, NCAA Considering Transfer Changes: Players With 2.6 GPA
Would Not Have to Sit Out a Year, BIG LEAD SPORTS (Jan. 4, 2013, 12:53 PM), http://
www.thebiglead.com/index.php/2013/01/04/ncaa-considering-transfer-changes-
players-with-2-6-gpa-would-not-have-to-sit-out-a-year/ (presenting new 2.6 GPA
benchmark as “Free Transfer With a 2.6 GPA”).
119. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (providing NCAA’s research on GPA and R
academic success with transfers).
120. See Semester GPA, GPA CALCULATOR, http://gpacalculator.net/how-to-cal-
culate-gpa/semester-gpa/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (providing chart comparing
GPA to letter grades).
121. For a discussion on the potential benefits and detriments of free agency
for student-athletes with at least a 2.6 GPA, see infra notes 122-148 and accompany- R
ing text.
122. See Matt Norlander, supra note 18 (explaining potential effects altera- R
tions in transfer rules can have on college basketball).
123. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (explaining desire NCAA has in making R
“sure student-athletes are academically successful” and that NCAA’s transfer rules
“help [student-athletes] achieve that goal”).
124. See id. (expressing NCAA’s understanding that some old rules were made
with “competitive intent” rather than “academic concern”).
125. See generally MICHAEL LITOS, CINDERELLA: INSIDE THE RISE OF MID-MAJOR
COLLEGE BASKETBALL (Sourcebooks, Inc., 1st ed. 2007) (explaining difficult path
mid-majors have had in securing games against high-profile teams on grandest of
stages in order to promote their team, school, and recognition).
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more exciting and enjoyable to watch.126  Mid-majors that histori-
cally would not stand a chance against perennial powerhouses are
now winning at a more frequent rate, largely due to the increase in
talent on their teams.127  Players that are highly recruited out of
high school may not be given the role on their college team that
they were originally promised and therefore may wish to transfer
elsewhere to become the star of the team.128  Thus, student-athletes
from top schools may seek to transfer to smaller schools to go from
being the small fish in the big pond to becoming the big fish in the
small pond.129
Finally, the rule change may limit or even end the frowned-
upon “one-and-done” crop of student-athletes.130  “One-and-done”
student-athletes are those who attend college and play basketball
for a single year in order to satisfy the NBA age requirement for the
NBA Draft.131  Although there have been some great talents that
only played for a single season and have had great success on both
the college and professional levels (e.g. Carmelo Anthony), this
practice is frowned upon because it prevents the development of
126. See Maxwell Ogden, Gonzaga Basketball: Bulldogs Complete Rise of the Mid-
Major with No. 1 Ranking, BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 4, 2013), http://bleacherreport.
com/articles/1553387-gonzaga-basketball-bulldogs-complete-rise-of-the-mid-major-
with-no-1-ranking (focusing on Gonzaga University’s rise to prominence to claim
number one ranking in college basketball).  Gonzaga’s number one ranking in
2013 is the first time since 2008 that a mid-major school achieved a number one
ranking. See id.  (stating although Gonzaga may be mid-major, it is likely to win
national championship in 2013).
127. See Michael Litos, supra note 125, at 260 (stating that George Mason’s R
run to Final Four in 2006 was “merely step one” in push for mid-majors to compete
against major conference powerhouses).
128. See Incoming Mid-Major Transfers for 2012/2013, COLLEGE BASKETBALL
BLOG (Mar. 16, 2012, 12:49 AM), http://ncaabball.wordpress.com/2012/03/16/
incoming-mid-major-transfers-for-20122013/ (providing list of over thirty players
transferring from major schools to mid-major schools to player basketball this
year).
129. See id. (presenting scouting report for new roles of players in their new,
smaller schools).  For example, Isaiah Armwood left Villanova University, a mem-
ber of the Big East, for George Washington and is described as being a “rotation
player at Villanova,” but “could play a starring role [at George Washington].” See
id. (providing example of student-athlete who transferred schools for larger role).
130. See Myron Medcalf, Roots Of One-And-Done Rule Run Deep, ESPN.COM
(June 26, 2012), http://espn.go.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/
8097411/roots-nba-draft-one-done-rule-run-deep-men-college-basketball (explain-
ing impact one-and-done rule has on college basketball).
131. See Charlie Zegers, One and Done, ABOUT.COM, http://basketball.about.
com/od/collegebasketballglossary/g/oneanddone.htm (last visited Dec. 19, 2013)
(defining “one-and-done” as “a slang term used to describe a player who stays in
college for a single year before bolting for the NBA”).
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players preparing for the NBA.132  For every successful “one-and-
done-er,” there are dozens of student-athletes that do not succeed
in the NBA and do not have the requisite academic background on
which to fall back.133  The new transfer rule may limit the one-and-
done trend in college basketball because those athletes that believe
they can succeed at the next level may not get the exposure or acco-
lades required to catch the eyes of the NBA teams and scouts in
their first year.134  Therefore, they will transfer and become the
“top-dog” at a new school and use at least one more year to improve
their game and fame.135  Thus, the new transfer rules have the po-
tential to improve the academics of college basketball student-ath-
letes, increase the parity of teams across America and limit the
amount of one-and-done student-athletes.136
Despite these potential benefits, there are many potential det-
riments to the changes in the transfer rules.137  First, athletes may
get preferential treatment in order to keep their GPA above the
proposed 2.6 benchmark to dissuade them from transferring.138
The 2.6 benchmark is just higher than most Division I universities’
minimum GPA requirement for eligibility, and therefore, some ath-
letes may receive special considerations in course selection and
grade distribution in order to maintain eligibility or reach the 2.6
132. See id. (describing Carmelo Anthony as one of most significant “one-and-
done” athletes in recent memory because he led Syracuse to 2003 National Title in
his first year and was then selected third overall in 2003 NBA Draft).
133. See Loud Cloud, NBA One and Done Rule: The Effects, LOUDCLOUD (Jul. 3,
2012) http://loud-cloud.net/2012/nba-one-and-done-rule-the-effects/ (stating
that since “one-and-done” rule has been in effect since 2006, forty-eight players left
for draft after only one year in college, but only five have become solid, contribut-
ing players).
134. See Myron Medcalf, supra note 130 (explaining coaches such as Duke R
Head Coach Mike Krzyzewski, believe one-and-done student-athletes add to insta-
bility of college basketball).  Coach Krzyzewski stated that the one-and-done rule
has produced an abundance of transfers in college basketball; “Kids don’t stick to
the school that they pick and they want instant gratification.” See id. (emphasizing
student-athletes’ search for instant gratification at collegiate level).
135. See id. (quoting Coach Krzyzewski as saying, “It’s not just those elite play-
ers that might be able to go after one year.  There’s just the mentality out there
that if you don’t achieve after one year, maybe you should go someplace else.”).
Coach Krzyzewski states that for those elite players, they turn to the NBA; but for
the other players, they turn to another school via transfer. See id. (showing prob-
lematic aspect of one-and-done mentality in NCAA basketball).
136. For a discussion of the benefits of a free agency system in college basket-
ball, see supra notes 113-135 and accompanying text. R
137. For a discussion on the detriments of a free agency system in college
basketball, see infra notes 138-148 and accompanying text. R
138. See generally Dana O’Neil, College Basketball Doesn’t Pass the Test, ESPN.COM
(May 21, 2010), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/columns/story?columnist=oneil_
dana&id=5206806 (explaining inequity in college basketball academics).
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benchmark.139  Further, without a school’s ability to grant or deny
“permission to contract,” an athlete can transfer wherever they want
at any sign of discomfort they feel at their original school.140  This
policy runs counter to the NCAA’s goals and will be punished se-
verely with harsh new penalties, as well as fines for tampering.141
However, with the pressure of maintaining eligibility and keeping
up with alumni and school demand for the best athletes, some
schools may go to great lengths, even compromise the integrity of
their athletic program and violate NCAA policy, in order to keep a
student-athlete content.142  This drawback resulting from the rule
change would likely be prevented by the aforementioned harsher
penalties for all involved in player tampering.143
Another possible detriment will be the lack of loyalty between
student-athletes, coaches, and schools.144  With the development of
a free agency system, players will be motivated to achieve NBA suc-
cess and only serve their own self-interests.145  This can really dam-
139. See id. (providing that college basketball players are not incentivized to
perform well academically and current NCAA rules allow eligibility to those in
their first year so long as they pass six credits).  It is not until the end of the stu-
dent-athlete’s first year that the GPA kicks in as a limiting factor and some institu-
tions will do whatever it takes to keep their star players on the court or out in the
field to keep the athletic program going strong. See UNC Eyes Julius Peppers Contro-
versy, ESPN.COM (Aug. 14, 2012, 12:40 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/
story/_/id/8265076/north-carolina-tar-heels-probe-online-posting-possible-julius-
peppers-transcript  (providing details into Julius Peppers’ scandal at University of
North Carolina which showed leaked transcript indicating Peppers’ best grades
came from classes in Department of African and Afro-American Studies, which
were predominantly comprised of student-athletes and did not require
attendance).
140. See John Infante, NCAA Leadership Council Scales Back Potential Transfer
Changes, ATHNET (May 2, 2013), http://www.athleticscholarships.net/2013/05/
02/ncaa-leadership-council-scales-back-potential-transfer-changes.htm (presenting
synopsis of NCAA’s understanding and desire to change transfer rules).
141. See John Infante, supra note 90 (stating new, stricter rules regarding tam- R
pering student-athletes).
142. See Dana O’Neil, supra note 138 (explaining current investigation into R
University of North Carolina’s Julius Peppers’ academic treatment).
143. See id. (equating tampering to illegally recruiting student-athletes).
144. See Myron Medcalf, supra note 130 (reiterating Coach Krzyzewski’s view R
that student-athletes’ mentalities seek instant gratification for themselves and not
for team).
145. See Mike Strange, Mike Strange: College Basketball Experiencing Transfer Epi-
demic, GOVOLS.COM (Apr. 28, 2012, 8:12 PM), http://www.govolsxtra.com/news/
2012/apr/28/mike-strange-college-basketball-experiencing/ (quoting Tennessee
basketball coach Cuonzo Martin, “I think a lot of young guys, they want it now.
Nobody wants to sit on the bench, regardless of talent level.”).  As society changes
into a world of instant gratification, college basketball players constantly desire
instant gratification such as the freshman that wants to start over one of the five
returning senior starters. See id. (expressing lack of patience young players have
and therefore their high and sudden desire to transfer to see more floor action).
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age the culture of college basketball and lead student-athletes to
believe they should have more individual rights when making deci-
sions regarding college basketball.146  Thus, an initial fear the
NCAA has regarding the rule change is increased coaches’ tamper-
ing with student-athletes.147  Ultimately, the free agency system that
will develop from the rule change will cause student-athletes to
band together across the country to form a union so their voices
will be heard when the NCAA makes decisions regarding student-
athlete rights.148
2. Student-Athletes Unionizing
Once student-athletes realize their power to freely transfer
schools, just as a free agent does in professional leagues, they will
decide to band together as a cohesive unit to protect their rights
from being infringed upon and fight for more rights.149  Imagine
just prior to the start of the NCAA National Championship game,
after a 68-team tournament, the two championship teams refuse to
suit up and walk off the court, to make a stand declaring their rec-
ognition as employees, and not simply student-athletes, of the uni-
versities they play for.150  This may be a foreseeable result once the
transfer rules are applied and free agency in college basketball be-
146. See Eamon Brennan, Transferring Isn’t What It Used to Be, ESPN.COM (Jul.
19, 2012, 2:59 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/_/
id/61328/transferring-isnt-what-it-used-to-be (explaining change in culture as
more transferring occurs in college basketball).  The NCAA is attempting to rem-
edy this situation and provide for more rights to the student-athletes, who do not
have many rights to begin with. See id. (suggesting NCAA make new transfer rule
that preserves student-athletes’ already scant rights to seek out better situations).
147. See Matt Norlander, supra note 18 (stating that new transfer rules will R
result in increased tampering by coaches and potentially more coaches “tattling on
their peers”).
148. For a detailed discussion of the potential of players unionizing to better
represent their interest in college basketball, see infra notes 149-169 and accompa- R
nying text.
149. For a more detailed discussion of the potential unionization of college
athletes, see generally Nicholas Fram and T. Ward Frampton, supra note 24 (pro- R
viding detailed analysis of unionizing of college athletes under both federal and
state law). Cf. Tim Keown, Grambling Football Team Not Bluffing, ESPN.COM (Oct. 19,
2013, 10:16 PM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9845583/
grambling-football-players-not-bluffing (providing details regarding Grambling
State University’s football team which refused to get on buses to travel to an away
game in protest of conditions within football program).
150. See Eric Savitz, Should College Basketball Players Unionize – and Strike?,
FORBES.COM (Mar. 25, 2012, 7:40 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericsavitz/
2012/03/25/should-college-basketball-players-unionize-and-strike/ (hypothesizing
potential impact unionizing in college basketball could have on student-athletes’
rights).
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gins.151  Many people are beginning to realize the unchecked
power the NCAA has over student-athletes and are beginning to
take a stand in the name of student-athlete rights.152  Although
there have been attempts to band players together, such as the Na-
tional College Players Association (“NCPA”), there will not be any
real change to student-athletes rights until they begin to effectively
organize into a bona fide players’ union.153
The growing belief that universities and the NCAA are taking
advantage of student-athletes is the impetus for reforming the
NCAA’s current amateurism structure.154  Currently, the NCPA
serves as a nonprofit advocacy group and is the only independent
voice for college athletes throughout the country.155  Despite the
151. For a more detailed discussion on the potential creation of free agency
in college basketball, see supra notes 114-148 and accompanying text. R
152. See Dennis Dodd, California Passes Student-Athlete Bill of Rights, CBS SPORTS
(Oct. 9, 2012, 5:18 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/blog/dennis-
dodd/20525847/california-passes-student-athlete-bill-of-rights  (explaining new
California law implementing Bill of Rights for student-athletes protecting them
from inequities that they cannot change due to lack of resources).  Ramogi Huma,
president of the NCPA (based out of California) recognizes college athlete’s lack
of ability to make change and commends California for having an interest in pro-
tecting its students. See id. (providing California is only state to pass such Bill of
Rights while similar proposals have been discussed but were unsuccessful in
Oklahoma, Iowa and Indiana); see also S.B. 1525, 2011 625th Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2011)
(providing text for California Student-Athletes’ Bill of Rights); see also Andy
Staples, NCAA Puts Power in Question with Rapid Decision Regarding Penn State, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (Jul. 22, 2012, 5:36 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writ-
ers/andy_staples/07/22/ncaa-penn-state-decision/index.html) (detailing NCAA’s
abuse of power regarding its handling of Penn State University college football
sanctions).
153. See About NCPA, NCPA.ORG, http://www.ncpanow.org/about/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 19, 2013) (providing details of creation and recognition of NCPA); see
also J. Trevor Johnston, supra note 38 at 232 (explaining student-athletes have une- R
qual bargaining power and unequal economic relationship with NCAA because
student-athletes need NCAA competition to attain professional athletic careers
and therefore student strikes may not be effective in gaining rights).
154. See Robert Wheel, Miami, the NCAA and America’s Last Plantation, SB NA-
TION (Nov. 21, 2012, 2:40 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2012/
11/21/3676496/americas-last-plantation-ncaa-miami-shapiro (analogizing NCAA
and student-athletes’ relationship as plantation-owner and slave relationship); see
also Kathleen Miles & Patt Morrison, Are College Athletes Taken Advantage of? Should
They Be Paid?, 89.3KPCC (Sept. 28, 2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.scpr.org/pro-
grams/patt-morrison/2011/09/28/20850/collegesportsshametaylorbranchpaycol-
legeathletes/ (implying college athletes do not receive sufficient compensation for
services they provide to their universities); see also Warren K. Zola, The Year in Re-
view: College Sports Reform Reaches the Tipping Point, HUFFINGTON POST (May 20, 2012,
4:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/warren-k-zola/the-year-in-review-col-
leg_b_1530210.html (stating it is apparent that as universities and the NCAA chase
television revenue, they do so without looking out for student-athlete interests).
155. See About NCPA, supra note 153 (detailing that since inception of NCPA R
in 2001, it has been featured on many media outlets and has over 17,000 members
from over 150 Division I campuses throughout country).
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NCPA’s stated mission and victories it has already won for college
athletes, a more specified players’ labor union will need to develop
for higher-profile sports, namely football and basketball, in order to
provide student-athletes the leverage needed to stand against the
NCAA and its rulemaking.156
By definition, a labor union is an association, combination, or
organization of employees who band together to secure favorable
wages, improved working conditions, better work hours, and to re-
solve grievances against employers.157  Negotiations between stu-
dent-athletes and the NCAA would allow the student-athletes to
discuss the working conditions, practice times, class times, settle
grievances and ultimately discuss monetary compensation.158  How-
ever, the key issue here is that NCAA student-athletes are techni-
cally not employees and therefore would not be able to unionize
under current law.159  Nevertheless, some states, California in par-
156. See NCPA Wins Victories for College Athletes, NCPA, http://www.ncpanow.
org/news_articles?id=0003 (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (listing reforms NCPA has
either led or advocated to benefit student-athletes’ rights).  The list includes pro-
viding for a $10 million fund to aid former athletes that wish to complete their
undergraduate or graduate degrees, sponsoring the California Student-Athlete Bill
of Rights, as well as being a key advocate for eliminating limits on health care for
college athletes, expanding the NCAA Catastrophic Injury Insurance policy, ex-
pansion on the types of scholarships players can receive and the elimination of the
$2,000 salary cap on money student-athletes earn from part-time jobs. See id. (not-
ing that “as the NCPA succeeds, college athletes gain the basic protections they so
desperately need”).  On January 28, 2014, Cain Kolter of Northwestern University
took the first steps towards creating a student-athlete players union when he,
alongside his football teammates, filed paperwork with the National Labor Rela-
tions Board (“NLRB”) in an attempt to create the first student-athlete’s players
union. See Zac Ellis, Northwestern Football Players Seek to Unionize; What Does the Devel-
opment Mean?, SI.COM, (Jan. 28, 2014), http://college-football.si.com/2014/01/
28/northwestern-football-kain-colter-labor-union/ (explaining developments in
Northwestern football team’s attempts to unionize and subsequent steps needed to
ensure proper unionization).
157. See Labor Union Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://legal-dictionary.
thefreedictionary.com/Labor+Union (last visited Dec. 19, 2013) (providing de-
tailed definition and history of labor unions in United States).
158. See Robert Wheel, supra note 154 (arguing college athletes, football play- R
ers in particular, need to be paid so they can unionize like NFL teams can, negoti-
ate their rights to earn wages, and have due process rights); see also Robert A.
McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, Article, A Trail of Tears: The Exploitation
of the College Athlete, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 639 (2010) (explaining how student-
athletes are taken advantage of by NCAA and its member universities).  See generally
David Warta, Comment, Personal Foul: Unnecessary Restriction of Endorsement and Em-
ployment Opportunities for NCAA, 39 TULSA L. REV. 419, 424 (2003) (stating, “The
NCAA and its member institutions control, among other things, the minimum
number of credit hours in which a student must be enrolled, awards and gifts that
the athlete may receive, and with whom the athlete may consult about professional
opportunities.”).
159. See generally Waldrep v. Texas Emp’rs Ins. Assoc., 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex.
App. 2000) (holding student-athletes are not employees of private universities they
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ticular, are taking steps in developing and recognizing student-ath-
letes’ rights and providing them with compensation for the services
rendered to their universities.160
The creation of the California student-athlete Bill of Rights
may be the first step down a slippery slope of providing and protect-
ing the rights of student-athletes.161  Since the NCAA is not consid-
ered a “state-actor,” the NCAA is not subject to constitutional
mandates such as due process.162  Thus, when the NCAA rules on a
decision or issues sanctions regarding student-athletes, there are no
viable legal courses of action student-athletes can take to prevent
their rights from being infringed.163  With a predictable free-flow of
student-athletes transferring via an NCAA-made free agency, it is
attend); see also Robert Wheel, supra note 154 (comparing NFL and its labor nego- R
tiations to modern-America and NCAA and its stranglehold on student-athletes to
pre-1865 America).  Despite the loyalty that student-athletes provide to their uni-
versities and the NCAA, they have no leverage to negotiate with the NCAA and
thus must be paid and considered employees so they can have due process against
the NCAA’s decisions. See id. (explaining how due process is tied to right to earn
money); see also Tibor Nagy, Article, The “Blind Look” Rule of Reason: Federal Courts’
Peculiar Treatment of NCAA Amateurism Rules, 15 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 331, 342-44
(2005) (providing legal history of amateurism in NCAA sports).  The first case
prohibiting NCAA athletes from receiving monetary compensation for playing
sports was Jones v. NCAA. See id. at 343-46 (claiming court took naı¨ve look at lack of
monetary compensation for college athletes).
160. See Rohith A. Parasuraman, Note, Unionizing NCAA Division I Athletics: A
Viable Solution?, 57 DUKE L.J. 727, 728 (2007) (explaining currently, NCPA cannot
form labor union with college student-athletes because under National Labor Rela-
tions Act (“NLRA”), only employees can form valid labor organizations).  The
NCPA could only form a labor organization or union if “college athletes were ‘em-
ployees’ and the NCAA or its member institutions were ‘employers.’” See id. (con-
tinuing to provide definition of “employee” under NLRA as simply being
“something distinct from an ‘employer’”); see also Robert A. McCormick and Amy
Christian McCormick, supra note 158, at 644 (explaining origin of term “student- R
athlete”).  The term “student-athlete” was the NCAA’s response to the “1953 Colo-
rado Supreme Court decision that found an injured football player was an em-
ployee and consequently entitled to workers’ compensation for his injuries.” See id.
(citing Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423, 429-30 (Colo. 1953)).
161. See Dennis Dodd, supra note 152 (noting other states have already looked R
into providing Bill of Rights for their student-athletes). Cf. Advocates: Student Ath-
letes Need Bill of Rights, SALON.COM (Feb. 6, 2013, 9:16 AM), http://www.salon.com/
2013/02/06/advocates_student_athletes_need_bill_of_rights/ (noting states are
beginning to seek protection for student-athletes in secondary schools).
162. See generally Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179
(1988) (providing Supreme Court of United States’ opinion stating NCAA’s action
was not state action).
163. See Joe Nocera, Standing up to the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2012, at
A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/24/opinion/nocera-standing-
up-to-the-ncaa.html (analyzing holding in N.C.A.A. vs. Tarkanian and arguing that
because NCAA is not state actor, “its members have no constitutional rights”).
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foreseeable the NCAA will seek to unilaterally limit the transfers
and cause student-athletes to respond to protect their rights.164
In professional leagues, when the players see inequity between
the league and themselves, the players’ union strikes and the league
locks the players out.165  Then both sides negotiate the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), which is used to determine the
conditions of employment, such as compensation.166  In the case of
student-athletes, a strike is possible, but because student-athletes
are technically not employed by the NCAA and there is no CBA, the
NCAA would not be able to negotiate a labor agreement that pro-
tects the rights, such as compensation, of student-athletes.167  Thus,
in order for the student-athletes to be successful in creating a labor
union to bargain with the NCAA, the NCAA, local and national la-
bor boards, or courts will have to take steps to determine that ama-
teur student-athletes are in fact employees.168  This will likely be
done through the recently popularized idea that college athletes
should be monetarily compensated for their play.169
164. See Mission & Goals, supra note 108 (listing one of NCPA’s missions and R
stated goals is to “allow college athletes of all sports ability to transfer schools one
time without punishment”).  This shows the awareness student-athletes and the
NCPA have of the discriminatory effects limiting a student-athlete’s right to trans-
fer can have and is ultimately a right the NCPA is willing to fight to protect. See id.
(stating denial of one-time, no-penalty transfer option provided to many other
sports but not to football, basketball, baseball and ice hockey is “coercive and
discriminatory”).
165. See Collective Bargaining and Labor Arbitration: An Overview, WEX LEGAL
INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/collective_bargaining (last visited
Dec. 19, 2013) (providing definition and explanation of CBAs in labor
negotiations).
166. See id. (defining process of collective bargaining as, “negotiations be-
tween an employer and a group of employees so as to determine conditions of
employment”).
167. See Eric Savitz, supra note 150 (expressing idea that it is likely federal law R
may allow college athlete strike to gain more rights against NCAA); see also
Nicholas Fram & T. Ward Frampton, supra note 24 (proposing student-athletes R
may have right under both federal and state labor laws to unionize and be treated
as employees of NCAA).
168. See Rohith A. Parasuraman, supra note 160, at 746-48 (detailing potential R
options student-athletes have in becoming recognized employees of NCAA); see
also J. Trevor Johnston, supra note 37, at 223-35 (noting NLRB applies two tests to R
determine whether group of students are employees for unionization purposes).
The “Compensated Services Test,” and the “Primary Purpose Test,” are currently
used by the NLRB as the determining factors of whether a students receiving com-
pensation are employees of the universities they attend for union purposes. See id.
(explaining NLRB has determined graduate assistants, teaching assistants, and re-
search assistants to not be employees because those groups are “primarily
students”).
169. For a discussion on the push for college student-athletes to be moneta-
rily compensated for their services at their respective universities, see infra notes
170-206 and accompanying text. R
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3. Paying the Players
Once student-athletes understand they can freely transfer on
the college market to meet other universities’ demand for superior
athletes, the student-athletes will unionize to protect their rights.170
However, this can only be done if student-athletes as a group are
recognized as employees working for the NCAA and its member
institutions.171  The primary characteristic that distinguishes college
student-athletes and professional athletes is monetary compensa-
tion.172  Thus, if student-athletes can receive monetary compensa-
tion for their athletic performance for universities, then the courts,
as well as the NCAA, will have to recognize student-athletes as em-
ployees and allow them to unionize.173
The proposed transfer rules will be the final push needed to
provide monetary compensation to student-athletes because al-
lowing student-athletes to transfer without penalty opens up a mar-
ket for student-athletes and puts value on their skills.174
Recognizing student-athletes are the driving force behind hundreds
of universities’ financial success, providing the student-athletes with
economic compensation seems to be the realistic next step for stu-
170. For a detailed discussion of the potential of student-athletes unionizing,
see supra notes 149-169 and accompanying text. R
171. See Jon Solomon, supra note 108 (noting “labor laws would not recognize R
any group of athletes as a union because they are not legally employees.”); see also
Kathleen Miles & Patt Morrison, supra note 154 (noting one analyst’s belief that R
NCAA may be using term “student-athlete” as guise so student-athletes do not re-
ceive workers’ rights including worker’s compensation).  Kent Waldrep, former
running back for Texas Christian University (“TCU”), was paralyzed from the neck
down on the field and received limited help when paying for health-related bills
from TCU and no help from the NCAA. See id. (providing example of student-
athlete case similar to employee injury case that resulted in no workers’ compensa-
tion due to injured party’s status as student-athlete).
172. See Timothy Wyatt, Amateurism in College Sports: The “Pay for Play” Debate,
EXAMINER.COM (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/amateurism-
college-sports-the-pay-for-play-debate (explaining that main barrier between col-
lege athletics and professional sports is pay).  While Wyatt goes on to explain other
intangible differences between college student-athletes and professionals, pay is
the major difference between amateurs and professionals. See id. (expressing in-
trigue of collegiate sports is the exorbitant amount of “pageantry,” “heart,” and
“competition” despite student-athletes not being monetarily compensated); see also
Jones v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 392 F. Supp. 295, 302-03 (D. Mass. 1975)
(holding players receiving compensation prior to entering college sports cannot
compete in NCAA due to lack of amateurism).
173. See Michael J. Mondello & Joseph Bechham, Counterpoint, Workers’ Com-
pensation and Collegiate Athletes: The Debate Over the Pay for Play Model: A Counterpoint,
31 J.L. & EDUC. 293, 300 (2002) (noting that paying student-athletes may “open
the door for other employment claims, possible union representation, and negoti-
ation of wages, benefits, and conditions of work”).
174. For a discussion on the proposed free agency in college sports due to
newly proposed transfer rules, see supra notes 113-148 and accompanying text. R
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dent-athletes.175  Student-athletes confer many benefits to their uni-
versities, including composing a significant portion of a university’s
revenue, boosting schools’ nationwide recognition, increasing ap-
plicants, and increasing overall academic excellence.176  Thus, stu-
dent-athletes have a major role in bringing in a lot of money to
universities, and they should therefore have a stake in at least a por-
tion of it.177
The NCPA and student-athletes are not the only ones advocat-
ing paying student-athletes.178  NCAA President Mark Emmert has
175. See Tom Farrey, NCAA Athletes Can Pursue TV Money, ESPN.COM (Jan. 30,
2013, 12:02 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/8895337/judge-rules-
ncaa-athletes-legally-pursue-television-money (“Current, former and future athletes
are one step closer to protections and freedoms that other American citizens are
permitted.”).  Ramogi Huma, president of the NCPA, notes that the Former Col-
lege Athletes Association (“FCAA”) has been set up in the event former NCAA
student-athletes can recover, retroactively, a share of television and video game
revenue for the monetary benefits they conferred on their schools when they were
student-athletes there. See id.  (“FCAA will be prepared to ensure that athletes ulti-
mately receive what is rightfully theirs as Americans in a capitalistic, free market
society.”).
176. See Timothy Wyatt, supra note 172 (stating that deal NCAA made last R
season with Turner Broadcasting and CBS to televise all of “March Madness”
games through 2025 was for almost $11 billion).  Broadcasting, along with sales
from tickets, memorabilia, apparel, DVDs, video games and more find their way
back to the NCAA. See id. (explaining that NCAA enterprise is not sharing its reve-
nue with those who provide it).  Further, student-athletes provide an influx of busi-
ness to all of the surrounding entrepreneurs such as restaurants, t-shirt makers and
other local businesses during their seasons but do not receive any compensation.
See id. (describing impact University of Kentucky’s basketball team has on sur-
rounding area); see also From Mid-Major Cinderella to No. 1: Gonzaga Climbs to Top Spot
in AP Poll for First Time, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 4, 2013, 9:07 PM), http://www.
pennlive.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/03/from_mid-major_cinderella_to_n.html
(explaining impact basketball has had on small school of Gonzaga University).  “At
the time of Gonzaga’s run to the final eight, the school had fewer than 5,000 stu-
dents and was struggling with enrollment and budget issues.  Today, enrollment is
at 7,800 and new buildings are popping up on campus all the time.” Id. (explain-
ing impact Gonzaga basketball has had on rest of Gonzaga University).
177. See From Mid-Major Cinderella to No. 1: Gonzaga Climbs to Top Spot in AP Poll
for First Time, supra note 176 (quoting Gonzaga University’s President Dr. Thayne R
McCulloh as saying, “Our success with basketball is a significant component of the
convergence of forces that allowed us to grow.”); see also Lee Goldman, Sports and
Antitrust: Should College Students be Paid to Play? 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 206, 207
(1990) (explaining current inequity that student-athletes “who generate millions
of dollars for the university, must scrounge for basic expenses and struggle
through classes”).
178. See Mission & Goals, supra note 108 (listing one of NCPA’s goals to R
“[r]aise the scholarship amount” through sharing television revenue); see also
Eamonn Brennan, Bill Self Comes Around on Stipends, ESPN.COM (Oct. 23, 2012,
10:45 AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/_/id/65867/
bill-self-comes-around-on-stipends (providing Kansas University basketball coach
Bill Self’s support for paying student-athletes).  Self said, “[W]hen you’re sending
players from the West Coast to East Coast to play sports, to miss more classes, and
the schools benefit from that financially, why shouldn’t the people. . . responsible
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol21/iss1/9
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 132 Side A      03/14/2014   13:49:04
34639-vls_21-1 Sheet No. 132 Side A      03/14/2014   13:49:04
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\21-1\VLS109.txt unknown Seq: 31 11-MAR-14 10:39
2014] NCAA PROPOSED TRANSFER RULE CHANGES 247
openly admitted that student-athletes should receive some compen-
sation for their performances.179  Further, Federal Judge Claudia
Wilken recently dismissed a motion by the NCAA to prevent former
football and men’s basketball players from legally pursuing a cut of
live broadcast revenues.180  Although this ruling does not allow past
or present student-athletes to receive a share of television revenues
earned by conferences and universities, it demonstrates that NCAA
student-athletes can pursue television revenue.181  The future of
this case will be critical in recognizing student-athletes as NCAA em-
ployees and ultimately in providing them with pay.182  Despite the
potential benefit this case has for student-athletes, there are many
problems with providing student-athletes with monetary
compensation.183
In theory, compensating college athletes seems to be the fu-
ture for the NCAA; however, there are many potential hurdles the
NCAA needs to overcome in order to develop a functional sys-
tem.184  The first key issue is how the money will be divided
amongst the colleges and, ultimately, the teams at each univer-
for the business [benefit financially.]” See id. (explaining Coach Self’s transforma-
tion from being against paying student-athletes to being for paying student-
athletes).
179. See Eamonn Brennan, supra note 178 (stating NCAA President Mark Em- R
mert supported providing additional $2,000 cost-of-attendance stipend for student-
athletes).
180. See Tom Farrey, supra note 175 (providing details in current ongoing R
lawsuit from former NCAA players against NCAA for shares of revenue NCAA
made from TV deals while former players were student-athletes); see also Leslie E.
Wong, Comment, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit: Ed O’Bannon Takes on the NCAA
for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1069 (2010) (analyzing potential remedies for NCAA’s alleged infringement on
student-athlete publicity rights).
181. See Tom Farrey, supra note 175 (quoting former players’ lead counsel R
Michael Hausfeld saying, “Now the (NCAA and its co-defendants) are facing po-
tential liability in the billions of dollars instead of tens or hundreds of millions.”).
182. See id. (explaining currently, NCAA and student-athletes cannot negoti-
ate  shares of revenue flowing from media and other licensing contracts because
NCAA does not treat student-athletes as employees and student-athletes have not
organized to represent their interests collectively).
183. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, supra note 26 (presenting both R
benefits and detriments to providing student-athletes with monetary compensation
for playing).
184. See id. (providing counterpoints to arguments for paying student-ath-
letes); see also Eamonn Brennan, Q&A: NCAA President Mark Emmert, ESPN.COM
(Mar. 29, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/
post/_/id/56723/qa-ncaa-president-mark-emmert (giving President Emmert’s
thoughts on state of NCAA and issues with paying players), and Lee Goldman,
supra note 177 at 233 (arguing “there is nothing immoral about being paid for R
[lawful services student-athletes provide].”).
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sity.185  Paying all student-athletes would require either allocating a
percentage of revenue brought in by the revenue sports to the non-
revenue sports or eliminating non-revenue sports because there are
far more non-revenue sports than revenue sports.186  Moreover,
larger schools, which historically have had higher revenue from
their “big-time sports,” will have much more money to offer than
smaller, mid-major schools.187  Typically, student-athletes will “fol-
low the money” and transfer to schools where they can score a big
payday, instead of remaining or transferring to smaller market
schools.188
Further, if the NCAA pays its players, it will need to signifi-
cantly increase its oversight of college athletics to prevent any ille-
gal or unethical deals from occurring.189  Recruiting will become a
completely different animal and will not stop once a high school
player signs his letter of intent.190  Coaches and student-athletes will
constantly be in a state of flux, looking for the right combination of
talent, compensation, and prestige when selecting or transferring
schools.191  This provides ample opportunities for unethical behav-
185. See Eamonn Brennan, supra note 184 (quoting President Emmert saying, R
“[t]here are competitive balance concerns issues about it,” when speaking about
paying student-athletes and concerns smaller NCAA schools have).
186. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, supra note 26 (explaining R
problems with paying student-athletes when determining how much money to give
each athlete in different sports and potential disappearance of non-revenue sports
if student-athletes were to be paid).
187. See Timothy Wyatt, supra note 172 (noting that stipends that were voted R
to be provided to student-athletes were rescinded due to smaller universities’ ath-
letic directors and conference commissioners claiming they “couldn’t afford it”);
see also Lee Goldman, supra note 177 at 239 (explaining NCAA’s reasoning not to R
pay players to preserve competitive balance between universities).
188. See Joe Nocera, supra note 109 (explaining if colleges pay athletes, R
smaller schools may need to reconsider having big-time sports and may need to
eliminate their athletic programs altogether).
189. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, supra note 26 (arguing that R
paying student-athletes would lead to increase need for NCAA oversight because of
“corruption in college athletics”).
190. See Transfer Facts, supra note 5 (providing NCAA’s belief that current R
transfer rules regarding permission to contact another school prevent “continuous
recruiting of student-athletes once they are enrolled on a campus”); see also Nicole
Auerbach & Eric Prisbell, supra note 1 (stating “Coaches now often are forced to R
re-recruit some of their most talented players during the season to keep them.”).
191. See Nicole Auerbach & Eric Prisbell, supra note 1 (quoting recent trans- R
fer Alex Oriakhi, “Why would a coach want someone there who doesn’t want to be
there?  If a player doesn’t feel comfortable or happy with the situation, he has
every right . . . to go where he wants to go.”).  Oriakhi goes on to compare players
to coaches stating, “A coach can go where he wants for more money.  They’ll be
the first to leave when they get a better contract.  Why can’t a player go somewhere
for pure happiness?” See id. (providing Alex Oriakhi’s advocacy of free transferring
and essentially free agency in college basketball).
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ior that the NCAA’s regulation and enforcement committees will
need to address.192  These issues may seem daunting at first; how-
ever, once student-athletes can freely transfer, band together, and
begin to receive compensation, it is very likely that the relationship
between the NCAA and student-athletes will become similar to pro-
fessional sports leagues and their players.193
a. Paying Players Using Stipends
Regardless of the potential drawbacks, several models of pay
have already been proposed, with each model providing compensa-
tion to student-athletes as employees of the NCAA and its member
institutions.194  The Big Ten, a large “power conference,” has made
a proposal that provides compensation in a way similar to those that
receive work-study funds.195  Each player on scholarship will receive
an extra $2,000-$5,000 to serve as a monthly living stipend or a pay-
ment-for-play stipend.196  Another proposal, created by the South-
eastern Conference (“SEC”) provides more direct compensation
tied to a student-athletes on-field play.197  Under this model, advo-
cated by South Carolina head football coach Steve Spurrier, com-
pensation will be provided by an either per-game or per-minute
basis, up to a rate of $300 per-game, or $20 per-minute played in a
192. See Enforcement: Understanding the Current Structure, NCAA, http://www.
ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/ncaa/enforcement/index.html, (last visited
Dec. 19, 2013) (providing overview of structure of enforcement staff that oversees
information and possible violations of NCAA rules).
193. For a detailed discussion on free agency and potential unionizing of stu-
dent-athletes, see supra notes 105-169 and accompanying text. R
194. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, supra note 26 (giving overview R
of different models that have been proposed for providing monetary compensa-
tion to student-athletes).
195. See Brian Bennett, Big Ten Considers Pay Proposal, ESPN.COM (May 19,
2011, 1:32 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=6564134 (provid-
ing Big Ten Conference’s proposal to pay players stipend to cover additional costs
of school not covered by scholarship).
196. See id. (explaining that student-athletes have expenses in college not cov-
ered by their scholarship such as transportation and clothing).  Working part time
cannot cover the difference between a scholarship and a student’s living expenses
because of the significant time commitment of sports and academics. See Lynn
O’Shaughnessy, Do College Athletes Have Time to Be Students?, CBS NEWS (Feb. 18,
2011, 1:05 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505145_162-37244524/do-college-
athletes-have-time-to-be-students/ (listing average hours student-athletes dedicate
per week to their sport and explaining difficulty in attending class on top of such
demanding schedule).
197. See Lorenzo Arguello, Report: If It Were up to SEC Coaches, Players Would Get
Paid, BUSINESS INSIDER (May 30, 2012, 4:58 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
sec-paying-football-players-2012-5 (providing Coach Steve Spurrier’s suggestion of
paying college athletes for “game related expenses” around $300 per-game, per-
player).
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game.198  This would tie pay into performance, and would be the
most similar to a professional league’s pay.199
b. Paying Players Through Revenue Sharing
Another popular proposal is the Revenue Sharing from TV/
NCAA Proceeds model, which recommends sharing with the ath-
letes the revenue brought in from lucrative television contracts as
well as from jersey sales and other revenue sources.200  In the past
few college basketball seasons, the NCAA has signed a $14 billion
NCAA tournament TV rights contract, and in the current NCAA
“we’re-just-doing-what’s-best-for-our-bottom-line” world, splitting
that revenue with players seems to be the most equitable course.201
If fulfilled, these proposals will destroy amateurism and college
sports as we know it while eliminating many storied sports programs
that cannot afford to keep their programs running and
competitive.202
c. Independent Institutions Related to Each College
The solution for a foreseeable termination of amateurism is
the creation of an independent professional league for athletes
198. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, supra note 26 (providing details R
to Coach Steve Spurrier’s proposed model for paying student-athletes on per-
game, per-player basis).
199. See Lorenzo Arguello, supra note 197 (stating consistency SEC has in pro- R
posing “pay for play system[s]” for college athletes).
200. See  Steve Wieberg, NCAA President: Time to Discuss Players Getting Sliver of
Revenue Pie, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2011, 10:48:07 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.
com/sports/college/mensbasketball/2011-03-29-ncaa-pay-for-play-final-four_N.
htm (presenting NCAA President Emmert’s view on sharing television revenue
with student-athletes and providing them with more money in form of
scholarships).
201. See Eamonn Brennan, supra note 178 (providing statistics on NCAA’s tel- R
evision rights contract).  The current state of college basketball is one where con-
ferences are making their own television networks to generate revenue, schools are
realigning their conference affiliation on a regular basis without regard for geogra-
phy, and teams are doing what is best financially for themselves. See id. (proposing
student-athletes, should receive some sort of compensation to pay for everyday ex-
penses such as gas and pizza).
202. See Joe Nocera, supra note 109 (predicting shrinking of conferences and R
schools offering athletic programs when student-athletes get paid).  Nocera notes
that if most smaller schools cannot afford to pay their players, the result of mandat-
ing compensation would be a loss of forty-eight Football Bowl Subdivision pro-
grams and a loss of more than 230 Division I basketball schools. See id. (noting
such schools should just focus on being institutions of higher education). See also
NCAA Asks Judge for O’Bannon Case Decision without Trial, USA TODAY (Dec. 13, 2013,
8:38 AM) http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2013/12/13/ncaa-
obannon-name-and-likeness-suit-deposition-filing/4007373/ (summarizing
O’Bannon’s suit against NCAA made in pursuit of past television and video game
revenue former college athletes earned for NCAA).
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under a designated age.203  This proposal suggests that colleges and
universities hire players at a moderate salary, plus room and board,
and allow them free academic classes until they earn a degree, even
after they finish playing.204  This model will create a minor league
for professional basketball and football tied closely to schools and
universities; however, the players will be professionals instead of stu-
dent-athletes.205  Thus, this may solve the rifts that the new transfer
rules will create and may begin the NCAA’s adaptation of a new
institutional environment where athletic programs are separate
from their universities altogether.206
B. The Creation of Separate Institutions for Revenue Sports
1. Structure and Set-up of Independent Athletic Institutions
Although it may be a long way away, the solution to reconciling
the destruction of amateurism in college sports with maintaining its
current passion and culture is to privatize big-time college sports,
such as basketball and football, and make them separate entities
from their schools.207  The current model exploits athletic ability,
corrupts university admission standards, and diverts taxpayer re-
sources in order to fulfill the needs of big-time basketball and foot-
ball programs.208  Privatization of revenue sports is one proposed
solution to these problems that could satisfy all parties.209  College
203. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, supra note 26  (proposing inde- R
pendent professional league for athletes under twenty-three years of age).
204. See id. (stating that academics would still be tied into athletics, even after
athletes finish playing).
205. See Peter Yoan, Ben Howland Sorry for Talking Draft, ESPN.COM (Mar. 5,
2013, 6:16 PM), http://espn.go.com/los-angeles/mens-college-basketball/story/
_/id/9017039/ucla-coach-ben-howland-sorry-saying-shabazz-muhammad-going-
pro (quoting UCLA Coach  Ben Howland, “The current system makes the NCAA a
minor league for the NBA, and allows teams to evaluate potential draft picks under
organized, high level competition.”).
206. For a detailed discussion on the potential separation of athletics from
academic universities, see infra notes 207-232 and accompanying text. R
207. See Donald H. Yee, supra note 29 (recommending privatization of reve- R
nue sports beginning with football); see also Silvio Laccetti, Guest Columnist: Should
We Privatize Big-Time College Athletics?, SEATTLEPI.COM (Feb. 24, 2009, 10:00 PM),
http://www.seattlepi.com/local/opinion/article/Guest-Columnist-Should-we-
privatize-big-time-1300967.php (proposing privatization of big time revenue-reel-
ing college sports such as basketball and football).
208. See Silvio Laccetti, supra note 207 (noting flaws of college athletics and R
failure of sluggish NCAA to keep up with changing culture).  Academically, foot-
ball players average 220 and basketball players 227 points lower on the SAT than
their classmates. See id. (noting that colleges provide special admissions for ath-
letes on scholarship).
209. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, supra note 26  (raising proposi- R
tion of independent institutions that run college revenue sports).
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sports can still preserve most of their familiar features: rivalries will
continue, conferences will remain, and fans will get their college
sports fill.210  The only difference would be that the rights to oper-
ate the commercial sports program on behalf of the university
would be sold to an independent outside company made in the
school’s name (e.g., Villanova University would contract Villanova
Basketball Inc. to run its basketball program).211   This outside com-
pany would share the net profits from all revenue streams (i.e., tele-
vision, licenses, ticket sales, parking, etc.) with the related university
at a pre-determined, pre-negotiated rate.212  Athletes would be
compensated with a three or four year contract with a modest salary
(tied to demand and performance) and be given the chance to re-
ceive commercial endorsements and proper representation in ne-
gotiations with the business.213  Further, the outside corporation
can be funded by a number of sources, including private boosters,
alumni, and regional or national businesses.214
Separating revenue sports and academics at large schools
would prevent many problems that exist today with NCAA sanctions
for past violations.215  For example, the University of Southern Cali-
fornia (“USC”) has recently been punished because while former
player Reggie Bush played for USC, he received improper benefits
from outside boosters in violation of NCAA policy.216  However,
neither Reggie Bush nor his coach at the time, i.e. Pete Carroll,
were adversely affected by the punishment the NCAA placed on
USC because both are comfortably making millions of dollars in the
NFL.217  The loss of athletic scholarships and the two-year post-
210. See Silvio Laccetti, supra note 207 (explaining that from fan’s perspective, R
game will remain same).  Leagues, conferences and game sites would remain the
same. See id. (noting coaches and most personnel would remain same as well).
211. See Donald H. Yee, supra note 29 (providing example with USC Football R
Inc., corporation representing USC Trojans football team).
212. See id. (hypothesizing vast amount of revenue universities could recover
if they sell ad space on uniforms); see also Silvio Laccetti, supra note 207 (explain- R
ing that universities can take part of athletes’ contracts and put it towards
academics).
213. See Silvio Laccetti, supra note 207 (noting that despite fact college players R
would be getting paid, only elite would rise to play in top professional leagues such
as NBA).
214. See id. (providing alternative ways of funding privatized corporation).
215. See Donald H. Yee, supra note 29 (stating issue of timing in NCAA’s sanc- R
tions for universities that do not comply with NCAA rules and regulations results in
wrongdoers going unpunished).
216. See id. (noting incident occurred same time Pac-10 Conference was re-
aligning because of its desire to take revenue from Colorado and Utah markets).
217. See id. (noting USC football team also had its victories, including its 2004
national championship, that Reggie Bush helped secure vacated).  In essence,
these penalties are not punishing Reggie Bush or the former coaching staff. See id.
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season ban for “lack of institutional control” is now unfairly punish-
ing USC players who were in middle school when the incident
occurred.218  This is one of many examples of the difficulty the
NCAA has had with enforcing its amateurism policy and one of the
many incidents that would no longer occur once revenue college
sports are privatized.219  Transforming current student-athletes to
paid professionals will put an end to under-the-table compensation
and NCAA sanctions that do not punish the true culprits.220
2. Education for Professionals at Each Institution
An obvious issue with this proposal is that the athletes may not
receive an education despite being employees of the university;
however, this can easily be resolved in a number of different
ways.221  First, universities can offer an educational program to its
athletes, which the athletes may complete either during or after
their athletic career.222  This gives the athlete the ability to com-
plete his college degree when he has officially finished his career as
a professional athlete.223  Another option is for the corporation to
provide educational opportunities such as providing vocational clas-
218. See id. (noting current players are ones suffering penalties due to USC
and Pete Carroll’s “lack of institutional control”).
219. See Ohio State Gets One-Year Bowl Ban, ESPN.COM (Dec. 22, 2011, 7:17 PM),
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/7372757/ohio-state-buckeyes-
football-penalties-include-bowl-ban (providing sanctions on Ohio State’s football
team after both offending players and coach had already left Ohio State); see also
Ebenezer Samuel, If Oregon Hit with NCAA Sanctions Then Chip Kelly Should Suffer
Even Though He Bolted for NFL and Philadelphia Eagles, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Jan. 19,
2013, 2:34 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/score-ready-chip-
kelly-article-1.1243179 (advocating penalizing former Oregon University head
football coach Chip Kelly if NCAA penalizes Oregon football after Coach Kelly left
for NFL).
220. For a discussion of how the creation of privatized separate, yet related,
athletic institutions can limit the amount of NCAA violations and sanctions, see
supra notes 215-219 and accompanying text. R
221. See Ohio State Gets One-Year Bowl Ban, supra note 219 (providing alterna- R
tives to current educational system offered to student-athletes such as taking regu-
lar university courses once they gain admission on their own academic merit); see
also Silvio Laccetti, supra note 207 (proposing leadership training in business and R
communication skills via “the common practice of in-house corporate training”).
222. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, supra note 26 (proposing uni- R
versities may grant athletes “free academic classes until they earn a degree (even
after [their] playing days are over)”); see also Lee Goldman, supra note 177 at 240- R
41 (expressing that although NCAA has emphasized promoting educational val-
ues, due to commercialization, it has also highly promoted the “win at all costs”
mentality).
223. See Dennis A. Johnson & John Acquaviva, supra note 26 (comparing em- R
ployed college athletes to regular university employees such as groundskeepers or
cafeteria workers who are frequently given opportunities to take classes at universi-
ties they work for).
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ses or classes relating to running the front office of the corpora-
tion.224  This allows athletes to put the primary focus on their
athletic craft while providing them with the option to pursue alter-
native career choices if the athlete is unsuccessful in pursuing a ca-
reer in professional sports.225
3. The NCAA’s Role Under the Proposed Model
This model will limit the NCAA’s role relating to revenue
sports; however, it will not eliminate the need for the NCAA.226
Many critics have argued that the NCAA has been limiting the
growth of revenue sports through its archaic rules and lack of over-
sight in their enforcement.227  The NCAA and its regulations would
still remain for all non-revenue sports, allowing colleges to devote
more attention to each of those sports, rather than focusing all of
their attention on those sports generating a majority of the revenue
for that university.228  Colleges can still pay for non-revenue sports
using the revenue generated by television deals and corporate spon-
sors that fund their independent revenue sport institutions, as well
224. See Donald H. Yee, supra note 29 (shifting control over athlete’s academ- R
ics from universities for which athlete’s will play, to corporations for which athletes
will work).
225. See id. (recognizing that some athletes will not want to pursue any aca-
demic endeavors and rely solely on their athletic ability for success while other
academically gifted athletes will want to take regular university courses or voca-
tional classes); see also Lee Goldman, supra note 177, at 242 (explaining predica- R
ment student-athletes are in between performing in class and performing in
sports).  Legendary college football coach Bear Bryant is quoted as saying,
I used to go along with the idea that football players on scholarship were
‘student-athletes,’ which is what the NCAA calls them. Meaning a student
first and an athlete second. We were kidding ourselves, trying to make it
more palatable to the academicians. We don’t have to say that and we
shouldn’t. At the level we play, the boy is really an athlete first and a
student second.
Id. (explaining focus student-athletes put on athletics instead of school).
226. See id. (proposing that NCAA be eliminated in regards to revenue
sports).
227. See id. (classifying NCAA’s rules as “gibberish”); see also Steve Wieberg,
Despite Criticism, NCAA Takes Firm Stance on Professionalism, USA TODAY (Jan. 4, 2011,
1:41 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/2011-01-03-ncaa-pro-
fessionalism_N.htm (detailing criticism NCAA has received based on its actions
enforcing its rules and regulations).
228. See Donald H. Yee, supra note 29 (noting NCAA would only be elimi- R
nated for revenue sports). Cf. Mark Giannotto, Maryland Cuts Seven Sports on ‘Sad
Day’ in College Park, WASH. POST, Jul. 2, 2012, available at http://articles.wash-
ingtonpost.com/2012-07-02/sports/35486395_1_athletic-programs-track-program-
athletic-director-kevin-anderson (detailing University of Maryland’s decision to cut
eight smaller athletic programs but keep larger sports such as basketball and foot-
ball to handle university deficit); see also Lee Goldman, supra note 177, at 247 (sug- R
gesting universities must maintain nonrevenue sports to comply with NCAA
policies).
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as the money those teams make through commercial and endorse-
ment deals.229
Further, the NCAA could adopt specific rules for revenue
sports, such as revenue sharing between conferences or amongst
the entire NCAA, to maintain some control over those institu-
tions.230  Therefore, this proposal would allow universities to focus
more on academics and maintaining their non-revenue sports while
still receiving the benefits of revenue, exposure, and success from
their related privatized sports teams.231  Thus, the best way to avoid
the destruction of amateurism from the change in the transfer rules
will be to create independent athletic institutions to run revenue
college sports.232
V. CONCLUSION
The NCAA’s decision to alter the transfer rules to allow the
free transfer of athletes will be a decision that may change the face
of college sports forever.233  Despite the NCAA’s good intentions,
there may be many consequences from these alterations that
change the landscape of college sports.234  Once student-athletes
can select the schools to which they want to transfer without need-
ing permission from their original school, there is no stopping stu-
dent-athletes from testing the transfer market like a professional
229. See generally Michael A. Corgan, Comment, Permitting Student-Athletes to
Accept Endorsement Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Cre-
ated by Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 371 (2012) (presenting arguments in favor of student-athletes
being able to sign endorsement deals as means of compensation for services pro-
vided to universities).
230. See id. at 410-13 (explaining possible plans for sharing revenue amongst
student-athletes within a specific university); see also Jeremy Fowler, Smaller Confer-
ences Crafting Plan to Share Playoff Revenue, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 22, 2013, 10:09 PM),
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/blog/jeremy-fowler/21599899/
smaller-conferences-crafting-blueprint-for-playoff-revenue-sharing (detailing cur-
rent revenue sharing schemes used by smaller conferences to share playoff reve-
nue in revenue sports).
231. For a discussion on the benefits of the privatization of revenue sports in
college athletics, see supra notes 207-230 and accompanying text; see also Lee R
Goldman, supra note 177, at 247 (reconciling paying student-athletes instead of R
paying top academic students because of revenue student-athletes provide
university).
232. For a detailed discussion on the new transfer rules and the potential free
agency system they will create, see supra notes 90-148 and accompanying text. R
233. For a discussion on the proposed transfer rules, see supra notes 90-104 R
and accompanying text.
234. For a discussion of the potential consequences of the transfer rule
changes, see supra notes 105-206 and accompanying text. R
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free agent.235  Student-athletes will transfer schools to improve their
recognition, playing time, and overall position in the sport.236
Further, the rights of student-athletes to transfer schools at
their desire will need to be protected from infringement by the
NCAA.237  More associations like the NCPA will develop and pro-
vide a quasi-union for college student-athletes to protect their
rights until student-athletes are held to be employees of the univer-
sity and a full-blown union can be declared.238  This process will be
sped up due to student-athletes’ collective action in the demand to
be paid or to share in the revenue generated by their perform-
ances.239  Once student-athletes are monetarily compensated for
their performance and successfully unionize, college sports as we
know it will cease to exist.240
To resolve the foreseeable inability to run a successful aca-
demic institution along with an athletic business, universities will
ultimately privatize their big-time college sports.241  This will solve
the issue of revenue sports becoming too large for colleges and the
NCAA to handle.242  This decision will provide major benefits to all
parties involved, including the players, coaches, universities, fans
and non-revenue sports teams.243  Thus, the NCAA’s alteration of
the transfer rules will have a widespread impact, not only on those
235. For a discussion on the rise of free agency after the implementation of
the new transfer rules, see supra notes 113-148 and accompanying text. R
236. For a discussion on the reasons why student-athletes will transfer schools,
see supra notes 122-129 and accompanying text. R
237. For a discussion on the development of unions in college sports, see
supra notes 149-169 and accompanying text. R
238. See Leslie E. Wong, supra note 180, at 1103 (noting once O’Bannon suit R
is determined, if verdict is in favor of O’Bannon, then paying athletes for “per-
formance and appearances would qualify them as employees under the National
Labor Relations Act . . . regardless of the existence of a union”).
239. For a discussion on the potential split between colleges and their big-
time, revenue-making athletic teams, see supra notes 207-232 and accompanying R
text.
240. For a detailed discussion on the impact student-athlete unions will have
on the landscape of the NCAA, see supra notes 149-169 and accompanying text. R
241. See generally Donald H. Yee, supra note 29 (providing reasons and descrip- R
tions why big-time college sports need to be privatized).
242. See Brian L. Porto, The Legal Challenges to “Big-Time” College Sports: Are They
Threats or Opportunities for Reform?, 27-JUN VT. B.J. 41 (2001) (presenting legal chal-
lenges that big-time, revenue-making college sports face and changes that will be
coming for college sports).
243. For a discussion on the benefits of the privatization of revenue-making,
college sports, see supra notes 207-220 and accompanying text. R
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student-athletes wishing to transfer, but on all future athletes who
dream of one day representing a university on the playing field.244
Matthew R. Cali*
244. For a detailed discussion on the consequences of the NCAA changing
the current transfer rules, see supra notes 105-232 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Villanova University Law School; B.S. cum laude,
Villanova University, 2011.
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